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THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
of 1974 (ERISA)' represents the first comprehensive attempt
to regulate private pension and welfare benefit plans. The congressional
policy embodied in ERISA2 reflects an intent to protect the benefit
rights and retirement security of approximately forty million persons'
through 1) increased reporting to the government and disclosure to
participating workers,4 2) setting minimum standards for participation,
vesting, benefit accrual, and funding,5 and 3) the creation of an insur-
ance program for terminating pension plans.6 ERISA also establishes
uniform federal fiduciary standards to govern the conduct of persons
who manage or control the operations or assets of employee benefit
plans and sets forth procedures for enforcing those standards.7
It .is this final aspect of ERISA, the federal standards governing
the conduct of fiduciaries, particularly the "prudent man rule,"' that
* Copyright 1977, James D. Hutchinson.
t Member of the District of Columbia and Pennsylvania Bars. B.A., Dickinson
College, 1965; J.D., Villanova University School of Law, 1968.
This article is an amplification and extension of remarks of the author before
the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association
during the ABA's Annual Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia on August 10, 1976. Although
the initial remarks were made at a time when the author was Administrator of
Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs, United States Department of Labor, the views
expressed herein are those of the author. The author wishes to thank Gary A. Growe
of the George Washington University School of Law, Robert B. Coplan of the George-
town University School of Law, and Nancy V. Sisemoore of the George Washington
University School of Law for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381
(Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter cited as ERISA].
2. ERISA, § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. V 1975).
3. N. TURE, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 15-16 (1976).
4. ERISA, §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (Supp. V 1975).
5. Id. §§ 201-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1086.
6. Id. §§ 4001-4068, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1368. Subtitle A of title IV of ERISA
established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, a public corporation "within"
the Department of Labor, which is responsible for administering the plan termina-
tion provisions. Id. § 4002, 29 U.S.C. § 1302.
7. Id. §§ 401-514, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1144.
8. Id. § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). Section 404(a)(1) provides in
relevant part:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries and-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan:
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances .then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
(15)
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is the focus of this article. In the brief period since ERISA's enact-
ment on Labor Day 1974, no other portion of the Act has been the
subject of more discussion, confusion, and alarm. Initial reaction to
ERISA's fiduciary rules ranged from fears that they would destroy
the sound operation and management of private benefit plans to state-
ments that the basic rules for fiduciary conduct had not changed from
preexisting common law standards.'
Approximately one-half of the private work force in this country
participates in some form of private retirement program, and assets
of almost $200 billion are controlled by private retirement plans.10
The sound management of these plans is, therefore, an issue of vital
public importance. The question now is whether ERISA will be in-
terpreted in a way which serves two basic public policy goals: 1)
ensuring the continued growth and economic stability of private pen-
sion and welfare plans, and 2) protecting the massive asset base which
provides fringe benefit and retirement security to millions of workers
and their families.
In an attempt to develop a structure for analyzing these issues,
the following discussion will outline the rationale underlying the new
regulatory structure contained in ERISA. Then, the ERISA provi-
sions affecting the prudent man standard, including comparisons with
common law standards, will be reviewed. Finally, ERISA's prudent
man standard will be used as a framework in which to discuss the
development and implementation of investment procedures for man-
aging employee benefit plan assets.
II. REASONS WHICH PROMPTED ENACTMENT OF ERISA
A. The Need for Regulatory Controls
Before attempting to analyze ERISA's standards of conduct and
their application to the diverse universe of employee pension and wel-
fare benefit plans, a review of the evolution of the new regulatory
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like charac-
ter and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of
large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to
do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the
provisions of this title.
9. Prior to ERISA's enactment, Solicitor of Labor Lawrence Silberman stated
that ERISA's "statutory scheme ... is along the lines and direction which the courts
have gone in the development of trust law." Hearings on H.R. 16462 Before the
General Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. 521 (1969-1970) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 16462].
10. N. TURE, supra note 3, at 1-2.
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scheme may be helpful in predicting its application to particular fact
situations. During the course of the past decade, several congressional
committees conducted hearings and studies in an attempt to determine
the extent of employee benefit plan abuses." Although it was generally
recognized that many employee benefit plans had been soundly man-
aged and operated with honesty and integrity, it also was apparent
from the congressional findings that a major revision of the regulatory
system was needed in order to control existing abuses. 12 Hearings
documented examples of lost benefits, poor plan administration, misuse
and abuse of plan assets, criminal acts, and violations of basic fiduciary
obligations.'" Instances of abuse or negligent conduct by individuals
entrusted with the care of benefit plan assets included the investment
of plan money in high risk ventures with inadequate security, the
outright diversion of plan assets to satisfy the operating needs of the
sponsor corporation, and the dumping of worthless or declining stock
into a plan by the controlling shareholders of the sponsoring company.' 4
B. The Inadequacy of Prior Remedies
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, there were few effective
remedies available to correct abusive situations in a way that would
protect the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries and restore
lost or diverted assets to the plan. The available options were govern-
ment action under the Internal Revenue Code (Code),' 5 labor pro-
tective statutes such as the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act
of 1958,1" the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,17 and the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,1" or pur-
11. See, e.g., Hearings on Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972).
12. See S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
S. REP. No. 93-127], reprinted in 1 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT, 1974, at 587, 599 (1976) (prepared by
the staffs of the Subcommittee on Labor and the U.S. Department of Labor) [here-
inafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
13. See Hearings on Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study Before the Sub-
comm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1972).
14. See generally id. The files of the Department of Labor which served as the
basis for developing the Department's position during the legislative process recite
examples of abusive situations which occurred under the administration of prior laws.
Records on file at Division of Enforcement, Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs,
U.S. Dep't of Labor.
15. I.R.C. §§ 401-404, 501-503.
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (1970) (repealed 1974).
17. Id. §§ 141-188 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
18. Id. §§ 401-531 (1970).
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suit of sanctions under the criminal laws.'9 Private litigants often
were left to remedies under the diverse state laws governing the opera-
tions of trusts. None of these options was particularly effective.
In administering the Code, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
was the agency responsible for determining whether sponsoring em-
ployers and participating employees were entitled to certain tax benefits
for the establishment and maintenance of qualified employee benefit
plans.20  However, the Code was designed primarily to regulate the
receipt of tax benefits and to prevent tax abuse. The key to enforce-
ment under the Code was the power of the IRS to accept or contest
the qualified status of a plan. But the disqualification remedy under
the Code was used infrequently, because it resulted in the imposition
of Draconian penalties on innocent participants and beneficiaries. 2'
Section 503(b) of the Code permitted self-dealing between employers
and plans as long as the transaction was based upon adequate con-
sideration.12  Congress questioned both the effectiveness of existing
Code provisions and the manner in which the IRS implemented those
provisions so as to ensure that private pension plans operated in
compliance with the law.23
Section 302(c) (5) of the Labor-Management Relations Act
(LMRA), 24 which was enacted to prevent unilateral union operation
of employee benefit trusts, is the statutory base from which all jointly
trusteed employee benefit funds have developed. 5 The case law under
section 302 indicated that the majority of courts interpreted the
LMRA as applicable to the structure of covered plans and not as vest-
ing jurisdiction in the federal courts to mandate fiduciary responsi-
19. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 664, 1027, 1954 (1970) ; see notes 39-42 and accompanying
text infra.
20. See I.R.C. § 404(a) (allowing employers to deduct plan contributions as
ordinary and necessary business expenses); id. §§ 402(a)(1), 403(a)(1) (taxing
employees only when they receive benefits) ; id. § 501 (a) (exempting fund from pay-
ing tax on income earned by it).
21. See id. §§ 401(a), 503(a); S. REP. No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, 18
(1973); Hearings on Private Pension Plan Reform Before the Subcomm. on Private
Pension Plans of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 290-91
(1973).
22. See I.R.C. § 503(b). Section 503(b) prohibits only the creator of the trust,
substantial contributors, and corporations or family members associated with such
individuals from transacting with the plan; plan trustees and administrators are appar-
ently not included.
23. See SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, INTERIM REPORT OF
ACTIVITIES OF THE PRIVATE WELFARE AND PENSION PLAN STUDY, S. REP. No. 92-634,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1972) [hereinafter cited as S. R.P. No. 92-634] ; note 21 supra.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (Supp. V 1975). Section 302 generally prohibits
employers from making payments to employee representatives. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)
(1970).
25. See S. REP. No. 93-127, supra note 12, at 4, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 12, at 590.
[VOL. 22 : p. 15
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bility in the administration of trust funds. 26 Moreover, although any
person who willfully violates any of the provisions of section 302 is
guilty of a misdemeanor and is subject to a fine, imprisonment, or
both,27 the Justice Department historically did not consider section
302 a primary tool for insuring the proper use of employee benefit plan
assets.28
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA) 29 indirectly affects certain private employee benefit plans
through provisions requiring the reporting of information and the
bonding of persons handling plan assets.30 However, as a basis for com-
prehensive regulation of employee benefit plans, the LMRDA had sev-
eral major weaknesses. It was limited to union officials and, therefore,
could not control the conduct of employer-appointed trustees.3 ' In
addition, courts interpreting the LMRDA deferred to state law and,
held that union constitutions, bylaws, and resolutions could control
the definition of a fiduciary's responsibilities.82
Prior to ERISA, the law dealing most directly with private
employee benefit plans was the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure
Act (WPPDA), which provided the basis for some of ERISA's pro-
visions, such as the bonding provisions and rules on employment of
convicted persons.3  Essentially, the WPPDA required that plan
administrators compile, file, and send a description of the plan to
26. See, e.g., Haley v. Palatnik, 509 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (2d Cir. 1975); Snider
v. All State Adm'r, Inc., 481 F.2d 387, 390 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.,
957 (1974); Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal, Inc., 393 F.2d 421, 424-26 (1st Cir. 1968).
Most cases have held that the language of section 302(e) limits district court juris-
diction to restraining future violations of the section and does not permit granting
relief by way of accounting, receivership, or removal of trustees. See, e.g., id. at 426.
27. Section 302(d) of the Labor-Management Relations Act imposes a fine of
not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. 29 U.S.C.
§ 186(d) (1970).
28. See S. REP. No. 92-634, supra note 23, at 95-96.
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970).
30. The LMRDA requires every labor organization to file a copy of its constitu-
tion and bylaws, as well as an annual report, with the Department of Labor. 29
U.S.C. § 431 (1970). Also, the LMRDA empowers the Secretary of Labor to enter
such places and inspect such records and accounts and question such persons as he
may deem necessary to investigate violations. Id. § 521 (a) (1970).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1970); see Tucker v. Shaw, 308 F. Supp. 1, 3-8 (E.D.N.Y.
1970) (court found section 501 of the LMRDA inapplicable to trustees appointed by
the employer). For a discussion of fiduciary problems under the LMRDA, see Wollett,
Fiduciary Problems Under Landrum-Griffin, 13 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 267 (1960).
32. McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1163 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 911 (1976). See also Hood v. Journeymen Barbers, 454 F.2d 1347, 1355
(7th Cir. 1972); Clark, The Fiduciary Duties of Union Officials Under Section 501
of the LMRDA, 52 MINN. L. REV. 437, 447-48 (1967).
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (1970) (repealed 1974).
1976-1977]
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participants and beneficiaries upon written request.3 4 It was expected
that such information would enable participants to police their own
plans."3 The emphasis on participant policing under the WPPDA was
underscored by the limited investigative and enforcement powers given
to the Secretary of Labor. 6  Furthermore, the courts took a limited
view of the WPPDA, remitting an aggrieved participant to the narrow
remedy of subjecting administrators to limited liability for failure to
comply with the reporting and disclosure requirements of the Act. 7
Fiduciary obligations were not enforced."'
Although federal criminal statutes offer a vehicle for prosecuting
violations for theft, embezzlement, 9 false statements,4" and bribery4 '
34. Id. § 304. The WPPDA required the administrators of welfare and pension
benefit plans to publish a description of the plan and an annual report showing such
information as the amount and type of the plan's income, benefits, receipts and
disbursements, the plan's assets and liabilities, and the number of employees covered.
Id. §§ 304, 306 (1970) (repealed 1974).
35. S. REP. No. 93-127, supra note 12, at 4, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 12, at 590.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 308 (1970) (repealed 1974). Section 308(d) gave the Secretary
limited investigatory power to ensure the accuracy of the published information if he
had reasonable cause to believe that investigation might disclose violations of the Act.
Id. He had no authority to perform an annual audit or other reviews of plan activities
in order to check routinely on the accuracy of published information. See id.; S. REP.
No. 92-634, supra note 23, at 92.
37. See, e.g., Moyer v. Kirkpatrick, 265 F. Supp. 348, 350 (E.D. Pa. 1967),
aff'd, 387 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1968).
38. For a discussion of the weaknesses of the disclosure provisions of WPPDA,
see Hearings on H.R. 16462, supra note 9, at 463 (statement of former Secretary of
Labor George P. Shultz).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1970) provides:
Any person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or con-
verts to his own use or to the use of another, any of the moneys, funds, securities,
premiums, credits, property, or other assets of any employee welfare benefit plan
or employee pension benefit plan, or of any fund connected therewith, shall be
fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id.
40. Id. § 1027 (Supp. V 1975). This section provides:
Whoever, in any document required by Title I of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (as amended from time to time) to be published, or kept as
part of the records of any employee welfare benefit plan or employee pension
benefit plan, or certified to the administrator of any such plan, makes any false
statement or representation of fact, knowing it to be false, or knowingly conceals,
covers up or fails to disclose any fact that the disclosure of which is required by
such Act or is necessary to verify, explain, clarify or check for accuracy and
completeness any report required by such Act to be published or any information
required by such Act to be certified, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id. This section previously applied to the requirements of the WPPDA. See id.
§ 1027 (1970) (amended 1974).
41. Id. § 1954 (Supp. V 1975). This section provides:
Whoever being - (1) an administrator, officer, trustee, custodian, counsel, agent,
or employee of any employee welfare benefit plan or employee pension benefit
plan; or (2) an officer, counsel, agent, or employee of an employer or an em-
ployer any of whose employees are covered by such plan; or (3) an officer,
counsel, agent, or employee of an employee organization any of whose members
[VOL. 22 : p. 15
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss1/2
FEDERAL PRUDENT MAN RULE
affecting private employee benefit plans, congressional studies document
the limited viability of this enforcement scheme. For example, statis-
tics for 1971 show that only nine persons were indicted and six con-
victed for violations of theft or embezzlement, while only sixteen were
convicted for violations under the bribery statute.12 There were neither
indictments nor convictions for false statements or concealments. These
figures should not be surprising, because enforcement of the provisions
of title 18 of the Criminal Code raises the traditional constitutional
and procedural safeguards inherent in any criminal proceeding, such
as proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and protections against
self-incrimination. Although there were times when the criminal
process and the stigma of convictions were important, these criminal
sanctions were not remedial, since they did not restore lost assets or
afford the opportunity to change the underlying practices and policies
of the benefit plans involved.
Prior to ERISA, federal regulatory provisions in large measure
left plan participants and beneficiaries to the traditional remedies of
state statutory and common law.4" The inadequacy of this alternative
was a major force in the passage of ERISA. Under state law, the
terms of the trust instrument usually took precedence over any general
standards of prudence ;44 exculpatory clauses were generally valid;45
results were seldom uniform among the states ;46 plan participants and
beneficiaries were without ready access to detailed information about
their plans or ready access to the courts; and potential plaintiffs often
were faced with the prospect of high costs when litigating against large
are covered by such plan; or (4) a person who, or an officer, counsel, agent, or
employee of an organization which, provides benefit plan services to such plan
receives or agrees to receive or solicits any fee, kickback, commission, gift, loan,
money, or thing of value because of or with intent to be influenced with respect to,
any of the actions, decisions, or other duties relating to any question or matter con-
cerning such plan or any person who directly or indirectly gives or offers, or
promises to give or offer, any fee, kickback, commission, gift, loan, money, or
thing of value prohibited by this section, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both ....
Id. This section previously applied to the WPPDA. See 18 U.S.C. § 1954 (1970).
42. S. REP. No. 92-634, supra note 23, at 95. For examples of successful prosecu-
tions, see United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 953 (1971); United States v. Moore, 427 F.2d 38 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 965 (1970).
43. 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 12, at 3295-96.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 164 (1959).
45. Id. § 222; see S. REP. No. 93-127, supra note 12, at 29, reprinted in LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 12, at 615.
46. S. REP. No. 93-127, supra note 12, at 29, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 12, at 615. To the extent that modern plans are increasingly interstate
operations, the absence of uniformity is cause for concern. Id.
1976-1977]
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plans or sponsors.4 7 It was against this backdrop of ineffective regula-
tion of private employee benefit plans that Congress turned to the
fiduciary responsibility provisions which were ultimately included in
ERISA.
III. ERISA'S FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING FIDUCIARIES
A. Persons Classified as Fiduciaries
The definition of a fiduciary in section 3(21) (A) of ERISA
reaches all fiduciaries, thus extending beyond prior law, which focused
on the duties of trustees. This section includes anyone exercising
discretionary authority or control with respect to the management of a
plan or its assets.48 Therefore, persons considered to be fiduciaries
may include officers and directors of the plan, members of a plan's
investment committee, and persons who select these individuals.4" The
ERISA definition of a fiduciary focuses on the authority and responsi-
bility of individuals, rather than their titles. Interpretations of these
provisions by the Department of Labor adopt the position that only
persons who perform one or more of the functions described in section
3(21) (A) with respect to employee benefit plans are fiduciaries.bo
47. See ERISA, § 502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (Supp. V 1975) (providing
for the award of attorneys' fees) ; note 163 and accompanying text infra.
48. ERISA, § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (Supp. V 1975) states:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises
any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of
such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposi-
tion of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensa-
tion, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such
plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discre-
tionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such
plan. Such term includes any person designated under section 1105(c) (1) (B)
of this title.
Id.
Section 405(c) (1) (B) of ERISA allows the delegation to other persons of
certain fiduciary responsibilities by the named fiduciary. In addition, an investment
manager may be appointed. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c) (1) (B) (Supp. V 1975) ; see text
accompanying notes 61-65 infra.
49. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 323, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038 [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT].
50. See U.S. Dep't of Labor Interpretive Bulletin 75-8, 40 Fed. Reg. 47,491-92
(1975). As an example of the type of definitional problems that may arise, the Depart-
ment of Labor, in Opinion Letter 76-45 (April 26, 1976), responded to a public inquiry
concerning the potential fiduciary status of an individual serving as a member of a
committee bearing the responsibility of appointing an investment manager for the
plan. The issue was whether the individual could continue to serve as a member of
the board of directors of a trust company which was appointed to serve as the invest-
ment manager. Id. Section 408(c) (3) provides that one is not prohibited by section
406 from serving as a fiduciary in addition to being an officer or other representative
of a party in interest. ERISA, § 408(c) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c) (3) (Supp. V 1975)
see CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 49, at 323.
[VOL. 22 : p. 15
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For example, any person who performs purely ministerial functions
within a framework of procedures developed by others is not a
fiduciary.5
ERISA provides that every employee benefit plan shall be main-
tained pursuant to a written instrument which shall provide for one or
more "named fiduciaries" who must have the authority to control and
manage the plan.12 Plan trustees are to be named in the trust instru-
ment or appointed by a named fiduciary.13 These trustees have exclu-
sive authority and discretion over the management of the fund assets,
although the plan may provide that a trustee will be subject to the
direction of a named fiduciary who is not a trustee5 4 or may permit
authority to be delegated to an investment manager. 55
Once an individual becomes a fiduciary, he is responsible for
operating the plan solely in the interests of participants and benefi-
ciaries," adhering to the prudence standards to be discussed below,5"
accepting certain responsibility and liability for the actions of co-
fiduciaries,5" and preventing the plan from engaging in statutorily
defined "prohibited transactions."5 " The fiduciary is subject to per-
sonal liability for a breach of any of these obligations." °
B. Limiting Liability by Allocation or Delegation
of Responsibility
Section 402 (c)(3) of ERISA permits the appointment of an
"investment manager" by a named fiduciary with respect to control
or management of the assets of the plan. 6' Section 3(38) defines an
51. See generally 40 Fed. Reg. 47, 491 (1975).
52. ERISA, § 402(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
53. Id. § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
54. Id. § 403(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). Section 403(a)(1) provides that
a trustee may be subject to "proper" directions from the named fiduciary "which are
made in accordance with the terms of the plan and which are not contrary to [the
Act]." Id. However, if the trustee does properly follow instructions from a named
fiduciary, he generally is not to be liable for losses which arise out of the following
of such instructions. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 49, at 302. Similarly, a trustee
who is directed by an investment committee pursuant to the terms of the plan, should
follow such direction unless it is clear that the action to be taken would be prohibited
by the fiduciary responsibility rules of the Act or contrary to the terms of the plan
or trust. Id. at 298.
55. ERISA, § 403(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 103(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
56. Id. § 404(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1).
57. See text accompanying notes 73-163 infra.
58. ERISA, § 405, 29 U.S.C. § 1105 (Supp. V 1975).
59. Id. §§ 406, 407, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1107.
60. Id. § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109; see text accompanying notes 131-36 infra.
61. ERISA, § 402(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c) (Supp. V 1975). This section pro-
vides: "Any employee benefit plan may provide . . . (3) that a person who is a named
fiduciary with respect to control or management of the assets of the plan may appoint
1976-1977]
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"investment manager" as anyone who 1) has the power to manage,
acquire, or dispose of plan assets; 2) has acknowledged fiduciary
status in writing; and 3) is a bank (as defined in the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940) ,62 or an insurance company qualified under the
laws of more than one state to manage, acquire and dispose of plan
assets, or a person registered as an investment advisor under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.63 If a qualified investment manager
is properly appointed under section 402 (c) (3), the appointing fiduciary
is no longer responsible for individual investment decisions made by the
investment manager,64 except in those limited cases where the fiduciary
knowingly participates in or conceals a breach. Further, under section
402(c) (2), if the plan so provides, a named fiduciary may employ
other persons to render advice to the named fiduciary to assist him
in carrying out his investment responsibilities under the Act.65 Invest-
ment advice is defined in applicable regulations as 1) rendering advice
to the plan as to the value of securities or other property, or 2) recom-
mending the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securi-
ties or other property in a context where the person rendering such
advice or recommendation has either discretionary control with respect
to purchasing or selling securities or other property for the plan, or
where such person provides services which serve as a primary basis
for investment decisions with respect to plan assets and renders indi-
vidualized investment advice to the plan based on the particular needs
of the plan regarding such matters as investment policies and strategies
or diversification of plan investments.6 6
If the trust instrument provides for a procedure under which a
named fiduciary may designate persons who are not named fiduciaries
an investment manager or managers to manage (including the power to acquire and
dispose of) any assets of a plan." Id.
62. Act of August 22, 1940, ch. 686, tit. I, 54 Stat. 805 (codified in scattered
sections 15 U.S.C.) (amended 1970 & 1975).
63. ERISA, § 3(38), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38) (Supp. V 1975).
64. Id. § 405(d) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 1105 (d) (1). Section 405(d) (1) provides:
If an investment manager or managers have been appointed under section
1102(c) (3), then ...no trustee shall be liable for the acts or omissions of such
investment manager or managers, or be under an obligation to invest or otherwise
manage any asset of the plan which is subject to the management of such in-
vestment manager.
Id. Sections 405 (a) (1) and 405(d) (1) indicate continued cofiduciary liability in the
case of a knowing participation or concealment. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1), (d)(1)
(Supp. V 1975).
65. ERISA, § 402(c) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c) (2) (Supp. V 1975) ; see 40 Fed.
Reg. 47,491, 47,492 (1975).
66. 26 C.F.R. § 54.4975-9(c)(1) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c)(1) (1976).
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to carry out fiduciary responsibilities, the named fiduciary will not be
liable for acts and omissions of such cofiduciaries, except as provided
in section 405 of the Act.
67
Specific duties and responsibilities with respect to the operation of
the plan may be allocated among fiduciaries in accordance with the
provisions of the trust instrument.6" If such an allocation procedure is
properly used under section 405 (c), the named fiduciary will not be
liable for acts or omissions of other fiduciaries in carrying out fiduciary
responsibilities which have been allocated to them, except as provided
in section 405 (c) (2).69
Department of Labor Interpretive Bulletins outline the steps a
fiduciary may take when he believes that another fiduciary is or may be
taking action clearly contrary to the prudence requirements of section
404.7 If a fiduciary learns that another fiduciary has committed'a
breach, he has an obligation to "take reasonable steps under the circum-
stances to remedy the breach."'71 These steps would include either
notifying the plan sponsor of the breach, proceeding to an appropriate
federal court for instructions, or bringing the matter to the attention of
the Secretary of Labor for possible enforcement action. The legislative
view of the appropriate remedy is evidenced by the following statement:
The proper remedy is to be determined by the facts and circum-
stances of the particular case, and it may be affected by the rela-
tionship of the fiduciary to the plan and to the co-fiduciary, the
duties and responsibilities of the fiduciary in question, and the
nature of the breach.
72
Therefore, under ERISA, fiduciaries are permitted to allocate
certain responsibilities among themselves or to retain a qualified invest-
ment manager to whom they may delegate responsibility and liability
for investment decisions. In all cases, however, fiduciaries who allocate
or delegate responsibility must do so in accordance with plan docu-
ments, may continue to retain certain liabilities as co-fiduciaries and
still retain overriding responsibility to exercise prudence in under-
taking and continuing allocations or delegations.
67. ERISA, § 405(a), (c) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a), (c) (2) (Supp. V 1975).
See also 40 Fed. Reg. 47,491 (1975).
68. ERISA, § 405(c) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c) (1) (A) (Supp. V 1975).
69. Id. § 405(c) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c) (2).
70. U.S. Dep't of Labor Interpretive Bulletin 75-5, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,599-600
(1975). Mere resignation, without taking steps to prevent the imprudent action,
will not allow the minority trustees to avoid liability once they have knowledge that
the imprudent action is under consideration. Id.
71. ERISA, § 405(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (3) (Supp. V 1975).
72. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 49, at 299-300.
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IV. THE PRUDENT MAN RULE
A. Background
In spite of the importance of ERISA's prudent man rule, there
is relatively little legislative history to amplify its development. The
most expansive commentary available on the considerations presented
to the Congress on this issue can be found in the testimony of Secretary
of Labor Shultz before the House Education and Labor Committee
on April 16, 1970, when he testified regarding H.R. 16462.
73 With
some modifications, H.R. 16462 had language comparable to the word-
ing of the prudent man standard contained in section 404 of ERISA. 4
Secretary Shultz stressed one change in wording75 which was eventu-
ally included in the ERISA prudent man standard, thereby distinguish-
ing it from the common law rule. The common law rule was stated
in terms of exercising such care and skill as a man of ordinary
prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property. It was
feared that this language would not provide sufficient flexibility for
administrators of pension and welfare benefit plans whose financial
dealings often are significantly more complicated than those of per-
sonal trusts.
76
Secretary Shultz stressed that the prudent man formula have
built-in flexibility so that it would apply equally well to financial insti-
tutions and small trusts. Flexibility was needed to accommodate the
varying size, complexity, and purposes of different kinds of employee
benefit plans. In addition, trustees should be evaluated in terms of
the actions of other trustees facing similar circumstances.7 1 Such an
evaluation would include consideration of such factors as prevailing
economic conditions and the characteristics of the particular plan.
The purpose of the Shultz testimony, and that of the vast majority
of witnesses who appeared during the course of hearings on H.R.
16462, was to ensure that it would not be necessary to apply a single
rigid rule or standard to all employee benefit plans.7" The goal was
the development of a standard whereby the determination of prudence
73. Hearings on H.R. 16462, supra note 9, at 463.
74. Compare H.R. 16462, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., § 14(b) (1) (B) (1970), with
ERISA, § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (B) (Supp. V 1975). However,
ERISA has. added a diversification requirement. Id. § 404(a) (1) (C), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a) (1) (C).




79. See id. at 159, 163-64 (statement of Richard A. Van Dueren) ; id. at 292-93
(statement of H.C. Lumb) ; id. at 772-73 (statement of Preston C. Bassett).
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would turn on the facts of each case. This type of case-by-case analysis
is borne out in the ERISA Conference Report, where it is noted that
the courts should interpret the prudent man rule bearing in mind the
"special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans."8 It was within
this setting that the present prudent man standard embodied in section
404 was adopted.
B. The Scope of Section 404 Fiduciary Responsibilities
Section 404 provides that a fiduciary "shall discharge his duties
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries and . . . for the exclusive purpose of providing bene-
fits . . . and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the
plan.""' In discharging these obligations, the fiduciary is to exercise
"the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar
with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims." 2
As has been pointed out, the ERISA prudent man rule governs
all aspects of fiduciary responsibility, whereas pre-ERISA standards
traditionally were applied to judge the more limited activity of trustee
investment behavior. Therefore, the scope of the rule under ERISA
is far more expansive, encompassing all fiduciaries, not just trustees,
and applying to plan operation and administration as well as to the
management and investment of plan assets. 3
80. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 49, at 302.
81. ERISA, § 404(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
82. Id. Inherent in this responsibility is the obligation to "[diversify] the invest-
ments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circum-
stances it is clearly prudent not to do so." Id. The fiduciary must also act "in accord-
ance with the documents and instruments governing the plan in so far as such docu-
ments and instruments are consistent with the provision of this title." Id.
83. For example, section 405, which defines liability for the breach of fiduciary
obligations by cofiduciaries contains two cross references to section 404(a) (1), both
of which indicate that the prudent man rule under ERISA incorporates all of the
fiduciary duties under the Act. See id. §§ 404(a) (1), 405, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a) (1),
1105. First, section 405(a) (2) declares that a fiduciary shall be liable for a breach
of fiduciary responsibility by a cofiduciary if the fiduciary's failure to meet his obli-
gations under section 404(a) (1) in the administration of his specific responsibilities
enables the cofiduciary to engage in a breach. Id. § 405(a)-(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (2).
Second, section 405(c), which permits certain allocation or delegation of duties among
or by fiduciaries, provides that a named fiduciary who has so allocated or delegated
duties to a person who becomes a cofiduciary may be liable for an act or omission of
the cofiduciary. However, he is liable only to the extent that the named fiduciary
violated section 404(a) (1) with respect to the establishment or implementation of
the procedures in the plan permitting allocation or delegation. Id. § 405(c) (2), 29
U.S.C. § 1105(c) (2).
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The legislative history of ERISA expresses a congressional intent
to codify and make applicable to fiduciaries many of the principles in the
pre-ERISA law of trusts . 4 However, in addition to applying these
traditional standards to the investment decisions of trustees, the sec-
tion 404 standards and those contained in the accompanying sections
of part 4 of title I of ERISA s5 now govern the total conduct of plan
fiduciaries in their management and operation of employee benefit plans.
Therefore, the fiduciary must not only act prudently in the acquisition
and disposition of plan assets, but must be guided by'the same con-
siderations in such matters as establishing sound operating policies,
retaining advisors, and purchasing goods and services.
C. The "Solely in the Interests of" and "Exclusive Purpose"
Standards: Section 404(a) (1) (A)
The duty of fiduciaries to act solely in the interests of the partici-
pants and beneficiaries of an employee benefit plan is a direct descendant
of the common law duty of loyalty in the administration of trust funds."6
Conflicts of interest, as well as the appearance of conflicts of interest,
were strictly forbidden. An example of the application of this rule
can be found in City Bank Farmers Trust v. Taylor," a 1949 case
that refused to permit the trust company administering a trust to hold
the bank's stock after the bank and the trust company had merged.
Under the common law duty of loyalty, fiduciaries are forbidden from
entering into competition with the trust res 8 and are forbidden from
taking bonuses, commissions, or other compensation from parties deal-
ing with the trust.8 9 Remedies for violations of this duty of loyalty
include the removal of a trustee from office as well as enjoining the
disloyal acts."
84. S. REP. No. 93-127, supra note 12, at 29, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 12, at 615.
85. ERISA, §§ 401-514, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1144 (Supp. V 1975).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959); 2 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 170, at 1297-98 (3d ed. 1967). Disloyal acts by the trustee would include
purchasing trust property for himself individually or selling to the trust his personal
property or property in which he has a personal interest. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 170, Comments b, c (1959).
87. 76 R.I. 129, 69 A.2d 234 (1949).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170, Comment p (1959) ; see Sauvage
v. Gallaway, 329 Ill. App. 38,66 N.E.2d 740 (App. Ct. 1946).
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170, Comment o (1959); see Slay v.
Burnett Trust, 143 Tex. 621, 187 S.W.2d 377 (1945).
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 199 (1959). Losses caused by a
trustee's breach of trust may be recovered from him. See id. § 205.
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Prior to the adoption of ERISA, "solely in the interest" language
also was used in the LMRA9 l and the LMRDA.
2 Under the LMRA,9 3
some courts have relied upon this statutory language to support the
position that trustees of jointly administered trust funds are not free
to promote the interest of the party they represent, but are legally
bound to a standard of nonpartisan fiduciary responsibility. 4 On the
other hand, it has been argued that administration of a LMRA trust
fund is merely an extension of the collective bargaining process. 5 This
argument was bolstered by citations 6 to statutory language under sec-
tion 302 of the LMRA which requires that employers and employees
be equally represented in the administration of the trust funds." Ap-
parently, the statutory use of a representative was seen to connote
"partisan spokeman." Proponents of this "bargaining representative"
theory also cited the statutory provisions under section 302,"' which
provide for the appointment of neutral trustees and impartial umpires
as evidence that Congress envisioned that union and management
trustees should not be expected to act as impartial fiduciaries them-
selves.99
91. Labor-Management Relations Act, § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1970 & Supp. V
1975), provides in part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any employer or association of employers or any
person who acts as a labor relations expert, adviser, or consultant to an employer
or who acts in the interest of an employer to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay,
lend, or deliver, any money or other thing of value .... (c) The provisions of
this section shall not be applicable . . . (5) with respect to money or other thing
of value paid to a trust fund established by such representative, for the sole and
exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and
dependents (. . . jointly with the employees of other employers making similar
payments...).
Id.
92. Labor-Management Relations Disclosure Act, § 501 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 501 (a)
(1970), provides:
The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor
organization occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its mem-
bers as a group. It is, therefore, the duty of each such person, taking into account
the special problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold its money and
property solely for the benefit of the organization and its members and to manage,
invest, and expend the same in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and
any resolutions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder . ...
Id.
93. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
94. E.g., United Marine Div. v. Essex Transp. Co., 216 F.2d 410 (3d Cir. 1954).
95. Goetz, Developing Federal Labor Law of Welfare and Pension Plans, 55
CORNEaL L. REv. 911, 921-25 (1970).
96. Id. at 923 n.54.
97. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (Supp. V 1975).
98. Goetz, supra note 95, at 921-25.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (Supp. V 1975).
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The essential issue is whether trustees should be viewed as fidu-
ciaries or merely as bargaining agents of their appointing bodies. 0
In addressing this question, agencies and courts have held that trustees
are agents of the parties to the agreement only when the facts of the
case indicate that the trustees were not free to exercise their discretion
as to a particular issue.1 ' When the agreement establishes a trust
fund to be administered by the trustees for the exclusive benefit of the
affected employees and the fund is independently administered, the
trustees have been held not to be agents of the parties. 0 2 The proposi-
tions that trustees have full fiduciary responsibilities as a result of the
"solely in the interest" language in the LMRA and that the trust
agreement is not an extension of the collective bargaining contract have
significant support in the decisions.'0°
Courts have distinguished between the administration of pension
trust agreements and collective bargaining agreements in several ways.
100. A key to deciding the issue of "agent" or "trustee" status often will be the
difference between those acts which are undertaken to establish a plan and develop its
provisions and the actions which are taken to administer a plan once it has been
established. See In re Trustees of the Ironworkers Local 17 Pension Fund, PENS.
REP. (BNA) R-13 (Jan. 3, 1977) (Dworkin, Arb.).
101. In Local 80, Sheet Metal Workers, 161 NLRB 229 (1966), the union was
found guilty of an unfair labor practice for refusing to bargain by insisting that the
employer accept an industry promotion fund as a condition precedent to reaching an
agreement. Id. at 237. The trustees of the trust fund were found to be agents of the
union in that, while acting pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, the
trustees refused to accept payments into the trust fund tendered by the employer until
the employer agreed to contribute to the separate industry promotion fund. Id. at 234.
See also Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 130, 137
(2d Cir. 1963) (trustees were officials of, and served at the pleasure of, their appoint-
ing bodies).
102. NLRB v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 1913, 531 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1976).
This decision drew a distinction generally made by courts in this area:
It is generally agreed that both agents and trustees are fiduciaries, but there
are significant differences between the two. An agent acts for and on behalf of
his principal and subject to his control. A trustee acts for the benefit of the bene-
ficiaries of the trust; he is an agent only if he agrees to hold title for the benefit
and subject to the control of another .... Unless the Union can be said to have
control of the operations of the Trust, the Trust should not be treated as the
Union's agent.
Id. at 426 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
103. Traditional fiduciary responsibilities were applied by the court in Blanken-
ship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The court noted that the con-
gressional scheme in enacting section 302(c) (5) of the Labor-Management Relations
Act was to "reinforce 'the most fundamental duty owed by the trustee': the duty of
undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries." Id. at 1095 (citations omitted). The pro-
vision allowing for the appointment of a neutral trustee was in anticipation of the
honest differences in judgment that could arise. Id. The conclusion, that trustees are
not representatives of the parties but are fiduciaries, finds further support in Lamb v.
Carey, 498 F.2d 789, 793-94 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Miniard
v. Lewis, 387 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968); United
Marine Div. Local 333 v. Essex Transp. Co., 216 F.2d 410, 412 (3d Cir. 1954) ; Wynn
v. Heller, 391 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); American Bakeries Co. v. Barrick, 162
F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ohio 1958), aff'd mem., 285 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1960).
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First, jurisdictional sections of the LMRA, which authorize suits for
breach of the collective bargaining agreement, have been held to be
inapplicable to a suit seeking interpretation of the pension agreement. 0 4
Even though pension rights have their origin in the collective bargain-
ing agreement, pension rights are uniquely personal and cannot be liti-
gated under the LMRA.0 5 Second, courts have not deferred to the
process of arbitration in pension disputes, despite the national policy
favoring arbitration of labor disputes.'0 6 In the pension area, courts
often interpret the trust agreement and find no need for the appoint-
ment of a neutral umpire. 107 Thus, the enactment of ERISA, with
its "solely in the interest" provision, should not force trustees of jointly
administered plans to redefine their role in fund administration. Under
the LMRA and ERISA, the trustees in most situations must view
themselves as fiduciaries rather than as collective bargaining agents.
The Conference Report on ERISA sheds little light upon the
"solely in the interest" provision,10 8 although it is recognized that
plan assets generally should not inure to the benefit of the employer.'0 9
However, even with this limitation, certain exceptions permit the
return of employer contribution in specific situations.x"
The requirement that fiduciaries act solely in the interests of
participants and beneficiaries arises from an overall duty of loyalty, and
should be read in conjunction with the "exclusive purpose rule" of
section 404(a) (1) (A), which provides in part that "a fiduciary shall
discharge his duties with respect to a plan ... (A) for the exclusive
purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries;
and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.""'
104. E.g., Cuff v. Gleason, 515 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1975), construing LMRA, §
302(c) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (1970).
105. See Cuff v. Gleason, 515 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1975); United Steelworkers v.
Pullman-Standard Car Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1957). The conclusion to be
drawn from these cases is that the trust agreement is not merely a labor agreement and
that, therefore, the joint trustees are something more than an extension of the collective
bargaining table.
106. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
107. See Poston v. Caraker, 378 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Weinstein v. Brasso,
69 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2436 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
108. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 49, at 303.
109. Id.
110. The Conference Report stated:
An employer's contributions can be returned within one year after they are made
to the plan, if made as a mistake of fact .... Also, if an employer contributes
to a plan on the condition that the plan is tax-qualified, or on the condition that a
current tax deduction is allowed for the contribution, and it is later determined
that the plan is not qualified (or the deduction is not allowed), the contribution
can be returned if the plan provides for it.
Id.
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Since these requirements are in the conjunctive, any particular trans-
action must satisfy both requirements." 2
Section 401 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code traditionally has
required that qualified retirement plans be administered for the "exclu-
sive benefit" of the employees and their beneficiaries." 3 As interpreted
by the IRS, the term "exclusive" was read to mean "primary", i.e.,
a transaction benefiting a third party was not a violation of the Code
if it were for a proper plan purpose, prudent, and in the best interests
of the participants." 4 In discussing the background and meaning of
section 404 of ERISA, the Conference Report reviewed criteria pre-
viously developed by the IRS to implement the exclusive benefit rule
contained in section 401(a) of the Code.'15 However, after listing
these prior interpretations by the IRS, the conferees indicated that to
the extent that a fiduciary meets the prudent man standard of section
404 of ERISA, he will be deemed to have met the exclusive benefit
requirement retained in the Code. Thus, although prior "exclusive
benefit" standards may be relevant historical guidance, section 404
standards now appear to be controlling. Such an interpretation is
further reinforced by a review of additional legislative history indicating
congressional dissatisfaction with prior Code sanctions and the IRS
administration in this area. 1 ( The Department of Labor recently filed
an action against the fiduciaries of an employee benefit plan, even
though the plan was deemed a qualified employee stock ownership plan
112. A fiduciary does not satisfy the exclusive purpose rule by a transaction which
merely defrays reasonable expenses of administration unless those expenses were also
incurred solely in the interest of the participants. See Cummings, Purposes and
Scope of the Fiduciary Provisions Under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 31 Bus. LAW. 15, 36-37 (1975).
113. I.R.C. § 401 (a) provides:
(a) Requirements for Qualification. - A trust created or organized in the
United States and forming part of a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan
of an employer for the exclusive benefit of his employees or their beneficiaries
shall constitute a qualified trust under this section ....
114. In explaining the exclusive benefit test (i.e., for the sole benefit of the em-
ployees), the IRS stated that it does not mean that others are prohibited from receiv-
ing any benefit. Rev. Rul. 494, 1969-2 C.B. 88. The specific requirements which had
to be met by an investment to satisfy the exclusive benefit test were as follows:
(1) the cost must not exceed fair market value at time of purchase; (2) a
fair return commensurate with the prevailing rate must be provided; (3) sufficient
liquidity must be maintained to permit distributions in accordance with the terms
of the plan, and (4) the safeguards and diversity that a prudent investor would
adhere to must be present. However, the requirements set forth in item (2) with
respect to a fair return is not applicable to obligatory investments in employer
securities in the case of a stock bonus plan.
Id. See also Rev. Rul. 65, 1969-1 C.B. 114.
115. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 49, at 302.
116. Cummings, supra note 112, at 36. For a discussion of congressional dissatis-
faction with IRS activities in the pension area, see S. REP. No. 992-634, supra note 23,
at 97; S. REP. No. 93-127, supra note 12, at 4-5, reprinted in LEGISLATIvE HISTORY,
supra note 12, at 590-91.
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(ESOP) by the IRS. The Department's complaint alleged that many
of the fiduciaries' actions in converting the prior profit-sharing plan
into an ESOP were violations of the fiduciary provisions of section
404.117
D. Care, Skill, Prudence, and Diligence:
Section 404 (a) (1) (B)
The specific articulation of ERISA's prudent man rule, as set
forth in section 404(a) (1) (B), 1 8 is discussed in depth later in this
article."" For the present, it should be emphasized that the entire
scope of the general fiduciary obligations are subject to the prudent
man rule. Therefore, standards of prudence govern actions ranging
from the selection of an investment manager, to developing cost-
sharing arrangements for administrative and support services, to the
collection of delinquent contributions. Furthermore, even when admin-
istrative exemptions from the prohibited transaction rules are granted
under section 408, the exempt transaction remains subject to the general
standards of prudence.
120
E. Diversification: Section 404(a) (1) (C)
The requirement of diversification finds its roots in the common
law. When imposed, this duty was merely an application of the general
rule as to the care required of a trustee in making investments.' 2'
While there was some disagreement among the states in approaching
this issue, the courts frequently held that a trustee was under a duty
to diversify investments. 2 2 They proceeded on the theory of reducing
the risk of large losses and followed the "proverbial injunction not




117. Usery v. Whately, No. 77-6004A (E.D. Va., Jan. 5, 1977).
118. ERISA, § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (B) (Supp. V 1975).
For the text of section 404(a) (1) (B), see note 8 supra.
119. See text accompanying notes 164-89 infra.
120. See Class Exemptions from Prohibitions Respecting Certain Transactions in
Which Multiemployer and Multiple Employer Plans Are Involved, Prohibited Trans-
action Exemption 76-1, 41 Fed. Reg. 12,740 (1976); Exemption from Prohibitions
Respecting Certain Classes of Transactions Involving Employee Benefit Plans and
Certain Broker-Dealers Reporting Dealers and Banks, 40 Fed. Reg. 50,845 (1975).
121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 227, 228, Comment c (1959).
122. The Massachusetts view was that a trustee was ordinarily under a duty to
diversify investments. See First Nat'l Bank v. Truesdale Hosp., 288 Mass. 35, 192
N.E. 150 (1934). On the other hand, some courts have taken the position that there
is no duty to diversify. See In re Ardriance's Estate, 145 Misc. 345, 260 N.Y.S. 173
(Sur. Ct. 1932) ; In re Seager's Estate, 340 Pa. 73, 16 A.2d 19 (1940).
123. First Nat'l Bank v. Truesdale Hosp., 288 Mass. 35, 192 N.E. 150, 152 (1934)
(although failure to diversify is normally a breach of duty, court found under the
circumstances that trustee acted prudently).
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ERISA has adopted much of the philosophy of the diversification
rules as set forth by the American Law Institute Restatement (Second)
of Trusts (Restatement) in section 228.124 However, unlike the
Restatement rule, under ERISA, plan documents cannot override the
diversification requirement; but a potential exemption from the diver-
sification requirement is available if it was clearly prudent not to
diversify under the circumstances. 125 The Conference Report explicitly
stated that it was not intended that a more stringent standard of pru-
dence be established with the use of the term "clearly prudent.' ' 12  The
use of this language merely indicated that in an action to recover plan
losses based on breach of the diversification requirement, the plaintiff
will have the initial burden of demonstrating that there has been a
failure to diversify. The defendant fiduciary will then carry the burden
of demonstrating that the failure to diversify was prudent.127 The logic
of this position follows from the emphasis that ERISA places on
diversification: "The basic policy [of the Act] is to require diversi-
fication.'
28
Although not attempting to state the requirement as a fixed per-
centage, the conferees did indicate that "a fiduciary should not invest
the whole or an unreasonably large proportion of the trust property
in a single security" and should be wary of heavy concentration in
geographical areas or industries.'29 The Conference Report drew
heavily on the Restatement philosophy as to the factors to be considered
in diversifying investments. 18  The Restatement recognizes that special
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 228 (1959) provides: "Except as
otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, the trustee is under a duty to the bene-
ficiary to distribute the risk of loss by a reasonable diversification of investments,
unless under the circumstances it is prudent not to do so." Id. ERISA, § 404(a)
(1) (C) provides: "A fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan ...
(c) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly not prudent to do so." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a) (1) (C) (Supp. V 1975).
125. ERISA elevates the diversification requirement to a statutory requirement.
ERISA, § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (C) (Supp. V 1975). The terms
of the trust instrument are effective only insofar as they are consistent with the pro-
visions of ERISA. See id. § 404(a) (1) (D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D); text
accompanying notes 141-49 infra.




130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 228, Comment d (1959), states: "The
trustee should not usually invest the whole or an unreasonably large proportion of
the trust property in a single security." Id. Comment e to § 228 of the Restatement
further provides:
Ordinarily the trustee should not invest the whole or an unduly large pro-
portion of the trust property in one type of security or in various types of securities
dependent upon the success of one enterprise or one class of enterprises or upon
[VOL. 22 : p. 15
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circumstances might arise when a trustee would be excused from diver-
sifying investments.' 8 ' As mentioned earlier, ERISA also recognizes
the possibility of such situations and places the corresponding burden
of justification on the trustee.'32
As a corollary to the diversification requirement, some courts
have held a trustee liable for failure to dispose of assets which, at the
time of the trust's creation, were improper investments. 183  There are
numerous cases in which a trustee has been surcharged for failing to
sell valueless or declining securities within a reasonable time after the
creation of the trust.3 The rule is well stated in In re Taylor's
Estate8 5 wherein the court found that a trustee is not immune from
liability for the retention of unauthorized securities merely because the
testator had purchased them. 8  Liability will result from failure to
conditions in one locality, since the effect is to increase the risk of large losses.
Thus, although the trustee may be authorized to invest in industrial stocks, he
should not invest a disproportionate amount of the trust fund in the shares of
corporations engaged in a particular industry. If he is investing in mortgages
on real estate he should not invest a disproportionate amount of the trust fund in
mortgages in a particular district or upon a particular class of property so that a
decline in property values in that district or of that class might cause a large loss.
Id. Comment e. The position taken by the Restatement, that it is improper for a
trustee to invest too large a proportion of the trust funds in the securities of a par-
ticular locality, is supported by case law. See, e.g., In re Ward's Estate, 121 N.J.
Eq. 555, 192 A. 68 (Prerog. Ct. 1936), aff'd per curiam, 121 N.J. Eq. 606, 191 A.
772 (1937).
131. Compare CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 49, at 304, with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 228 (1959). The Restatement provides:
Since the rule stated in this Section is an application of the general rule stated
in § 227, there may be special circumstances in which the trustee is excused from
diversifying investments. Thus, where the trust estate is very small it may be
proper for the trustee to invest the whole or substantially the whole of it in one
security or type of security. If, for example, the trust estate amounts to one or
two thousand dollars, it may be proper to invest the whole amount in a single
mortgage. So also, in times of crisis and general financial instability, it may be
proper to invest a large portion or even the whole of the trust estate in a single
type of security such as government securities. In any event the trustee is not
liable if under all the circumstances his conduct is that of a prudent man and he
complies with the provisions of the terms of the trust and of any statute which
may be applicable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TRUSTS § 228, Comment c (1959).
132. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 49, at 304.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 230 (1959) ; 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 86,
at § 230.3. The duty is also applied where the trustee is limited by statute or decision
to certain types of investments, and the securities received have ceased to be proper.
See id.
134. E.g., Paul v. Girard Trust Co., 124 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1941) (retention of
shares for 16 years) ; Mclnnes v. Whitman, 313 Mass. 19, 46 N.E.2d 527, 531-32
(1943) (retention of shares of stock) ; In re Garvin, 256 N.Y. 518, 177 N.E. 24, 242
N.Y.S. 830 (1931) (executor retained stock until it became valueless). However, no
liability would result if the trustee acted prudently in retaining the securities. See
In re Kent's Estate, 6 Cal. 2d 154, 57 P.2d 901 (1936) (failure to sell shares for three
years during the Depression).
135. 277 Pa. 518, 121 A. 310 (1923).
136. Id. at 529, 121 A. at 313.
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dispose of imprudent holdings within a reasonable time.137 A more
recent example of this principle can be found in Steiner v. Hawaiian
Trust Co.,3's an action by a successor trustee against the former trustee
for breach of trust.'39 Although recognizing that the rule of diversifi-
cation should be applied less strictly to the retention of investments by
the trustee, the court held that prudence dictates steps to achieve the
diversification of an overly concentrated initial portfolio. 4"
F. Adherence to Plan Documents Which Are Consistent with
Title I of ERISA: Section 404(a) (1) (D)
ERISA provides that a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with
respect to a plan "in accordance with the documents and instruments
governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are con-
sistent with the provisions of this title."'' The significance of this
provision lies in its departure from the common law rule of trusts
under which the trustee was charged with carrying out the intent of
the settlor as specified in the trust instrument. 4 ' The provisions of the
trust instrument were binding upon the trustee unless compliance was
impossible, illegal, or unless there had been a change of circumstances.'
Under ERISA, a fiduciary may disregard the plan document if com-
pliance with the document would be inconsistent with any of the provi-
sions of ERISA, including the prudent man standard. 44 For example,
137. Id.
138. 47 Hawaii 548, 393 P.2d 96 (1964).
139. Id. at 549, 393 P.2d at 99.
140. Id. at 563-64, 393 P.2d at 105-06.
141. ERISA, § 404(a) (1) (D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (D) (Supp. V 1975).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227(c) (1959). Comment q provides
that "[a] s a general rule a trustee can properly make such investments as are authorized
by the terms of the trust and cannot properly make investments which are forbidden
by the terms of the trust." Id. § 227, Comment q.
29 U.S.C. § 1102(a), (b) (Supp. V 1975) states in pertinent part:
For purposes of this title, the term "named fiduciary" means a fiduciary who is
named in the plan instrument, or who, pursuant to a procedure specified in the
plan, is identified as a fiduciary (A) by a person who is an employer or employee
organization with respect to the plan or (B) by such an employer and such an
employee organization acting jointly....
Every employee benefit plan shall-
(1) provide a procedure for establishing and carrying out a funding policy and
method consistent with the objectives of the plan and the requirements of
this title.
(2) describe any procedure under the plan for the allocation of responsibilities
for the operation and administration of the plan (including any procedure
described in section 1105 (c) (1),
(3) provide a procedure for amending such plan, and for identifying the persons
who have authority to amend the plan, and
(4) specify the basis on which payments are made to and from the plan.
Id.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 165-167 (1959).
144. A fiduciary must compare the trust instructions to the prudent man rule of
ERISA in order to assure the propriety of his actions.
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a plan provision permitting fiduciary self-dealing or authorizing the
acquisition or retention of employer securities in excess of section 407
limits145 would not be effective.
There are certain provisions which are required by the Act to
be included in plan documents and other provisions which are only
permitted by the Act. Sections 402(a), 402(b) and 403 (a) set forth
the provisions which must be included in the plan document.'46 For
example, the plan must be evidenced by a written document(s) 147 and
must provide for named fiduciaries who have the authority to control
and manage the operation of the plan. 48 The plan also must establish a
funding policy, an amendment process, and must specify the basis of
payments into and out of the plan. 149 An example of a "permissible"
provision would be the authority under section 402(c) (3) to appoint
an investment manager. 50
G. Liability for the Breach and Available Civil Remedies
Under title I of ERISA, a fiduciary who breaches the fiduciary
requirements of the Act may be held personally liable for any losses
to the plan resulting from his breach and may be required to restore
to the plan any profits earned through the use of plan assets; he is
subject to such other appropriate relief as may be ordered by a federal
court.' 5 ' The language in section 409 is quite broad, and the nature
of the relief that may be obtained either by the Department of Labor or
by private litigants is limited only by the particular facts of a case and
the plaintiff's ability to obtain creative relief from the court.'
52
In addition, section 410 of ERISA provides that exculpatory
provisions which relieve a fiduciary from liability for breach of the
fiduciary responsibility rules are void as inconsistent with public
policy.'5 3 This section marks a significant departure from the common
145. 29 U.S.C. § 1107 (Supp. V 1975).
146. Id. §§ 1102(a), (b), 1103(a).
147. ERISA, § 402(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
148. Id.
149. Id. § 402(a) (2), (b), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a), (b).
150. Id. §402(c) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c) (3).
151. Id. § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 provides:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall
be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting
from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary
which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall
be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.
Id.
152. See, e.g., Eaves v. Penn, No. 76-0450D (W.D. Okla. Dec. 29, 1976).
153. ERISA, § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (Supp. V 1975).
1976-1977]
23
Hutchinson: The Federal Prudent Man Rule under ERISA
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976
38 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 22: p. 15
law in many states. 5 4 Congress apparently did contemplate the use of
insurance to absorb some liability:
However, a plan may purchase insurance for itself and for its
fiduciaries to cover liability or loss resulting from their acts or
omissions if the insurance permits recourse by the insurer against
fiduciaries in case of breach. Also, . . . a fiduciary may purchase
insurance to cover his own liability and an employer or union may
purchase liability insurance for plan fiduciaries.' 55
One of the key changes brought about by ERISA is the assign-
ment of major enforcement responsibilities to the Department of Labor
under the Act. In addition to the traditional criminal penalties set
forth in section 501 for willful violations of the reporting and disclosure
rules,' the Department has been given broad civil investigatory and
enforcement powers under sections 502 and 504 of the Act.5 7 These
powers include significant investigatory powers under sections 504(a)
and 504(b), and liberal subpoena power under section 504(c) of the
Act, which incorporates by reference the authority contained in the
Federal Trade Commission Act.5" Under section 502(a), the Secre-
154. 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 86, at § 222.
155. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 49, at 320-21; see ERISA, § 410(b), 29
U.S.C. § 1110(b) (Supp. V 1975).
156. ERISA, § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (Supp. V 1975). Penalties include a fine
of up to $5,000 or up to one year imprisonment, or both, for an individual, and fines
up to $10,000 for others. Id.
157. Id. § 502(a)(2), (4), (5), (6), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), (4), (5), (6).
158. Id. § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 1134. Section 504, provides:
(a) The Secretary shall have the power, in order to determine whether any
person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this title or any
regulation or order thereunder - (1) to make an investigation, and in connection
therewith to require the submission of reports, books, and records, and the filing
of data in support of any information required to be filed with the Secretary
under this title, and (2) to enter such places, inspect such books and records and
question such persons as he may deem necessary to enable him to determine the
facts relative to such investigation, if he has reasonable cause to believe there may
exist a violation of this title or any rule of regulation issued thereunder or if
the entry is pursuant to an agreement with the plan. The Secretary may make
available to any person actually affected by any matter which is the subject of an
investigation under this section, and to any department or agency of the United
States, information concerning any matter which may be the subject of such
investigation; except that any information obtained by the Secretary pursuant to
section 6103(g) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 shall be made available only
in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. (b)
The Secretary may not under the authority of this section require any plan to
submit to the Secretary any books or records of the plan more than once in any
12 month period, unless the Secretary has reasonable cause to believe there may
exist a violation of this title or any regulation or order thereunder. (c) For the
purpose of any investigation provided for in this title, the provisions of sections 9
and 10 (relating to the attendance of witnesses and the production of books,
records, and documents) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 49,
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tary of Labor has the authority to initiate federal district court litiga-
tion seeking injunctive or other relief,"5 9 and under section 502(h),
the Secretary may intervene in litigation brought by private parties) ¢°
Section 502 also specifically confers the right upon plan participants
and beneficiaries to bring civil actions for relief from violations of the
fiduciary rules or other sections of the Act."" One of the important
parts of ERISA's enforcement strategy is the section 502 (g) provision
allowing the award of attorneys' fees in litigation brought by individual
participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries,0 2 a provision which may well
encourage private suits.'
6 3
V. ERISA VERSUS THE COMMON LAW RULE
The basic rule under state and common law was that a trustee
was under a duty in administering a trust to exercise such skill as a
man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own
property, with a view toward the preservation of the estate and the
50) are hereby made applicable . . . to the jurisdiction, powers and duties of the
Secretary or any officers designated by him.
Id.
159. Id. § 502(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(5). For recent examples of litigation
instituted by the Secretary, see Usery v. Wilson, No. 3-76-373 (E.D. Tenn., filed
Nov. 23, 1976); Usery v. Penn, No. 76-0450D (W.D. Okla., filed June 3, 1976).
160. ERISA, § 502(h), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(h) (Supp. V 1975). For recent examples
of intervention by the Secretary, see M&R Inv. Co. v. Fitzsimmons, No. LV 76-114
(D. Nev., filed Oct. 19, 1976); Harris v. Stryco Mfg. Co., No. C-75-1831 (N.D.
Cal., filed Oct. 14, 1976).
161. ERISA, § 502(a)(l)-(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. V 1975).
162. Id. § 502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g).
163. Provision for attorneys' fees was also made in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1970). Guidelines for the proper awarding of attorneys'
fees under title VII stem from the Supreme Court decision of Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968). In that case, the Supreme Court observed:
"If [the plaintiff] obtains an injunction, he does so ... as a 'private attorney general,'
vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority . . . . Con-
gress . . . enacted the provision for counsel fees . . . to encourage individuals injured
by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief . . . ." Id. at 402 (footnotes omitted).
Thus, courts have liberally applied the attorneys' fees provision of title VII.
See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) ; Clark
v. American Marine Corp., 437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'g per curiam 320 F. Supp.
709 (E.D. La. 1970). Factors to be considered include: 1) time and labor required;
2) difficulty of the legal issues; 3) skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
4) preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case;
5) customary fee; 6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 7) time limitations
imposed by the client or the circumstances; 8) the amount involved and results
obtained; 9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; and 10) the
nature and length of the professional relationship with the clients. 488 F.2d at 717-19.
Even in the absence of statutory authorization, the Supreme Court, relying upon the
substantial benefit test, has allowed the awarding of attorneys' fees to plaintiffs suing
under title I of the LMRDA. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1973).
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amount and regularity of the income to be derived. 11 4 Generally, there
developed two prudent man rules in the state courts.1 65 The "majority
rule" required a trustee to exercise the skill and prudence of a reason-
able, prudent man in retaining and investing trust assets,' while
other states adopted what came to be known as "legal lists," which
allowed only a percentage, if any, of the assets to be invested according
to the prudent man standard.167 The fact that a trustee was acting
gratuitously or for compensation did not alter the standard of prudence
required of the trustee, although high compensation could be evidence
of representations of superior ability.'16 8
The common law prudent man rule encompassed three major
duties for a trustee: 1) the duty of care; 2) the duty of skill; and 3)
the duty of caution. Generally, a trustee needed only to exercise that
amount of care and skill that an ordinary man would exercise. 6 ' As
a matter of public policy, if a particular trustee possessed greater skill
than that of an ordinary man, he was frequently held to a duty to
exercise that level of skill.'70 The issue did not concern the amateur or
professional status of the trustee. The issue centered on the level of
his actual ability and his claims of competence prior to the acceptance of
the trusteeship. 171 Investment decisions were governed by the trust
instrument or by statute and were generally judged by the conditions
prevailing at the time the investment was made.'
7 2
Prior to the development of modern investment strategies, the pru-
dent common law trustee was advised to consider the amount of the
trust estate, the situations and needs of the beneficiaries, and the cost
164. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS §§ 174, 227 (1959). Section 174 provides:
The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exer-
cise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing
with his own property; and if the trustee has or procures his appointment as
trustee by representing that he has greater skill than that of a man of ordinary
prudence, he is under a duty to exercise such skill.
Id.
165. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 612, at 410
(2d ed. 1960 & Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT].
166. Id. at 407-10. The prudent man rule was first applied to investments in
Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830). The court described the
duties of the trustee as follows:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is that he shall conduct himself
faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence,
discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs . . . in regard to the perma-
nent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the
probable safety of the capital to be invested.
Id. at 461; see 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 86, at § 227.
167. BOGERT, supra note 165, § 612, at 410, § 614.
168. Id. § 541 at 453; 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 86, § 174, at 1410.
169. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRUSTS § 227, Comments b, c, e (1959).
170. Id. § 714, Comment a (1959) ; see BOGERT, supra note 165, § 541, at 453-55.
171. BOGERT, supra note 165, § 541, at 453-54.
172. Id. § 612, at 418; 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 86, § 227, at 1807.
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of living.1 3  Factors to be considered in selecting specific portfolio
holdings included: 1) marketability of the security; 2) maturity date;
3) duration of the trust; 4) probable condition of the market at the
termination' of the trust; 5) probable condition of the market at the
time of reinvestment; 6) value of the trust and nature of the other
investments; and 7) the tax consequences of each security.' 74 As a
general rule, investments in speculative securities were outlawed, while
government securities and high-grade corporate bonds were usually
considered prudent. 175 But the states divided as to whether investment
in common stock was proper." 6 Today, the general prudent man
standard for trust investments has been adopted by statute or judicial
decree in a significant majority of states, although a few states still
require that no more than a certain percentage of the trust funds be
invested according to the prudent man standard.
Although these pre-ERISA standards of prudence are relevant as
a starting point for discussing the ERISA prudent man rule, the
common law of trusts cannot serve as a definitive guide to standards
under ERISA because of the basic differences in size, scope, and pur-
pose between personal trusts, whether inter vivos or testamentary, and
employee benefit plans. A key distinction lies in the absence of the
traditional tension between the interests of income beneficiaries and
remaindermen. 7 1 Pension trustees have more opportunity to make
investment decisions than do personal trustees. In a pension plan, the
regular influx of new capital generally alleviates some of the liquidity
pressures which personal trusts face. The tax structure of pension plans
also relieves plan trustees from such restrictive planning considerations
as to whether income will be taxed at capital gains or ordinary in-
come rates. 7 9
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227, Comment e (1959).
174. Id. § 227, Comment o; 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 86, § 227.12.
175. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TRUSTS § 227, Comment f (1959).
176. 3 A. SCOTT, supra note 86, § 227.11; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 227, Comment m (1959).
177. BOGERT, supra note 165, § 612, at 62 n.18 (Supp. 1976). Only a few states
still had legal lists in effect as of 1972. Id.; see note 167 and accompanying text supra.
178. See Note, Fiduciary Standards and the Prudent Man Rule Under the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 HARV. L. REv. 960, 967 (1975).
179. Id. at 968. If a pension plan qualifies under the Code, the employer can
deduct contributions to the plan as ordinary and necessary business expenses at the
time the contribution is made. I.R.C. § 404(a) (1). Employer contributions are not
includable in the taxable income of participating employees until actually received.
Id. § 402(a) (1). In some cases, benefit distribution will be taxed to the employees at
capital gain rates, i.e., lump-sum distributions. Id. § 402(a) (2), (a) (5). Finally,
investment earnings on funds accumulated under trust-funded plans are exempt from
taxation, unless they constitute unrelated business income. Id. § 501(a), (b).
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Of the more than 470,000 employee benefit pension plans that
recently filed reports with the Department of Labor under ERISA,'
76% use trusts to hold their assets.'"' Of the reporting plans, 77%
were defined contribution plans, while the remaining 23% were de-
fined benefit plans.8 2 Over 90% of all pension plans filing had fewer
than 100 participants within each plan, and the type of plans filing
included welfare plans, defined benefit pension plans, stock bonus plans,
profit-sharing plans, thrift and savings plans, and many plans with
combined features.' 88
A consideration of the diverse spectrum of plans in existence today
makes it clear that ERISA's prudent man rule contemplates a compar-
ative standard of performance. A fiduciary's conduct must be compared
to that of other fiduciaries "acting in a like capacity, and familiar with
such matters ... in the conduct of an enterprise of like character and
with like aims."'8 4 Thus, fiduciaries of large plans with large pools of
assets should be judged differently from fiduciaries of small plans which
accumulate limited asset holdings because of their paramount need for
liquidity. Trustee performance must be judged with due regard for
such varying plan characteristics as the nature and size of the plan,
funding status, liquidity needs, and contribution rates. 5
Some commentators have asserted that ERISA has created a
prudent expert standard. 86 Emphasis is placed on the key words
"familiar with such matters," in order to show the incorporation of a
standard of expertise. 8 7 It can be conceded that in appropriate cases,
the proper measure of a prudent man will indeed be that of a professional
money manager. However, a full review of the legislative history will
not support the general imposition of a prudent expert rule. The
emphasis remains on flexibility. 8 ' A plan trustee managing a small
plan with limited assets should not be held to the same standard of
expertise as a trust company.8 9
180. U.S. Dep't of Labor Press Release No. 76-1403, Background Paper (Nov.
12, 1976).
181. Id., Background Paper, at 2.
182. Id., Background Paper, at 1.
183. Id.
184. ERISA, § 404(a) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (B) (Supp. V 1975).
185. Hearings on H.R. 16462, supra note 9, at 477; see Klevan, Fiduciary Responsi-
bility Under ERISA's Prudent Man Rule: What Are the Guideposts?, 44 J. TAX.
152-53 (1976).
186. See Cummings, supra note 112, at 35.
187. Id.
188. See text accompanying notes 73-80 supra.
189. See Hearings on H.R. 16462, supra note 9, at 477, 521 ; Klevan, supra note 185,
at 153.
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VI. MANAGING EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN ASSETS
UNDER ERISA
A. Determining Plan Characteristics and Needs
Shortly after ERISA's enactment, a significant amount of com-
mentary developed as attempts were made to determine what impact, if
any, the Act would have on the manner in which employee benefit plan
assets were managed. As is frequently the case when any measure of
certainty is sought in a new area of regulation, traditional concepts
often were overlooked as the search proceeded to discover clear guide-
lines which would produce the "safest" or "most conservative" invest-
ment strategies so that fiduciaries would be insulated from challenge
under ERISA.'90
This approach ignores the fact that ERISA's prudent man rule
was meant to measure a fiduciary's performance against that of a pru-
dent man operating in a factual setting involving similar circumstances
and a plan "of a like character and with like aims."'91 Without a
threshold analysis of a plan's characteristics and needs, there is little
basis for determining whether a fiduciary has acted prudently in at-
tempting to serve the interests of the participants and beneficiaries of
the plan. Prudence is not an abstract concept. It must be measured in
the context of the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of the
relevant action.
Therefore, a thorough review of the characteristics and needs of
an employee benefit plan is a prerequisite to the development of sound
investment objectives and the selection of an appropriate investment
strategy to achieve those objectives. In the following discussion, the
terms "investment objectives" and "investment strategies" will be used
to identify two different aspects of the investment process. As used
herein, investment objectives are the broad precepts that identify a
plan's needs, as for example, a particular desired rate of return achieved
from a particular level of asset risk, with stated levels of liquidity,
within a stated time frame. Investment strategies are the methods
utilized by a trustee or investment manager to achieve the investment
objectives, as for example, a particular asset mix between equities and
fixed income securities, a planned schedule of the maturity dates of
190. See SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., BANK TRUST STOCK
HOLDINGS: RESPONSES TO FINANCIAL MARKETS SUBCOMMITTEE QUESTIONNAIRE
passim (Comm. Print 1976) (Question 11 and responses thereto). See also Merrion,
At Long Last, Word from Washington on What is 'Prudent,' Pensions and Invest-
ments, Sept. 13, 1976, at 1, Col. 1, and 45, col. 5; Gordon, Textile Workers Pension
Fund Master Craftsman, 12 PENSION WORLD 68, 80 (1976).
191. ERISA, § 404(a) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (B) (Supp. V 1975).
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bonds, certificates of deposit, or short term government securities to
meet identifiable cash flow needs. Well-articulated objectives developed
from a thorough review of plan characteristics and needs can provide
the basis for effective communication between plan sponsors 192 and
other fiduciaries as well as serve as the basis for reviewing a plan's
investment performance.
1. The Nature of the Plan
As noted earlier, employee benefit plans subject to ERISA range
from the corporate or multiemployer defined benefit plan to small
profit-sharing and stock bonus plans or myriad welfare benefit plans
with benefits ranging from hospitalization payments to training or
educational funds."9 3 These different types of plans often will have
distinctly different objectives.
For example, an apprenticeship, training, educational, or vacation
fund which expends most of its assets during the course of a year
would not be likely to accumulate large reserves which might benefit
from long term professional management. On the other hand, a mature
corporate pension fund with significant asset accumulations which can
be expected to be the source of defined benefit payments to retirees
over the course of many years should review investment alternatives
which would be consistent with the liquidity and safety needs of the
plan and still produce a reasonable rate of return consistent with plan
needs. For such a review, professional management is probably es-
sential.
Similarly, a defined benefit pension plan'9 4 with a young work
force, no unfunded liabilities, and a contribution level which is not a
significant portion of corporate profits, could evaluate its tolerance to
investment risks differently from a profit-sharing or other defined
contribution plan with a significant number of vested participants who
will be retiring in the near future and looking to their individual
account balances as the source of retirement security. In the defined
benefit plan, the amount of the pension benefit is fixed and is not
directly related to the investment performance of the fund.' 95 The
employer is required to make sufficient contributions to meet ERISA's
192. A "plan sponsor" is the employer, employee organization, or the group of
representatives who establish or maintain the plan. Id. § 3(16) (B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002
(16) (B).
193. See generally U.S. Dep't of Labor Press Release No. 76-1403, Background
Paper (Nov. 12, 1976).
194. ERISA, § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (Supp. V 1975) states: "The term 'de-
fined benefit plan' means a pension plan other than an individual account plan . . . ." Id.
195. For further discussion, see Note, supra note 178, at 961-63. See also CHAR-
TERED FINANCIAL ANALYSTS RESEARCH FOUNDATION, PENSION FUND INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT 27-52 (1969) [hereinafter cited as PENSION FUND MANAGEMENT].
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minimum funding standards to enable the plan to meet its liabilities
as they come due.' In the defined contribution plan, the amount of
the employer's contribution is fixed while the pension benefit varies
according to the plan's investment performance up to and including
the point at which participants receive their distributions. 9 7 There-
fore, the ultimate receipt of pension benefits depends upon the amount
-of the plan's assets allocable to the retiring employee.'98 These key
differences between the plans originate from their fundamental design
and result in differing dependence of both benefits and contributions
upon the investment performance of the fund. 9 Such differences
should be considered in the establishment of plan objectives.
2. The Size of the Fund
The amount of assets available for investment will play a signifi-
cant role in determining plan objectives and strategies. For example,
the asset base may determine whether a plan should consider a pooled
investment fund or insurance account which can offer the type of broad
diversification and flexibility that would not be achieved if the limited
assets of a small fund were invested independently. On the other hand,
a large fund may be able to design individual strategies more readily
adaptable to that plan's objectives than a pooled investment vehicle.
Moreover, the size of the asset pool may affect either the fund's ability
to absorb short term losses or the ease with which primary holdings
can be moved from one investment vehicle to another.
3. Operating Expenses and Unfunded Liabilities
Annual operating costs include current expenses such as invest-
ment and brokerage fees, actuarial, accounting, and legal fees, and
administrative costs which are inherent in recordkeeping, reporting,
and calculating and paying benefit claims. When these costs are com-
bined with the contributions necessary to meet current annual funding
requirements and the amortization of unfunded liabilities which may
be spread over a period of thirty or forty years depending upon the
type of pension plan involved, °° they directly affect the costs of main-
taining a plan and the desired level of investment return. Although
increased contributions are one available means of meeting escalating
operating and funding costs, the plan's actuary can be called upon to
196. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1085 (Supp. V 1975) ; see Note, supra note 178, at 962.
197. See Note, supra note 178, at 961.
198. See PENSION FUND MANAGEMENT, supra note 195, at 27-29.
199. See Note, supra note 178, at 962.
200. See ERISA, § 302(b) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b) (2) (Supp. V 1975).
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calculate the rate of return on investments which, when combined with
stated contribution levels, will meet the future funding and benefit
needs of the plan. These calculations, which directly affect the type of
investment strategy a fund may follow to produce the necessary return,
will vary when comparing a fund with minimal unfunded liabilities
against one with large unfunded liabilities.
4. Liquidity Considerations
The determination of a plan's current and future liquidity needs is
one of the primary factors affecting its investment objectives and the
type of investment strategy needed. Phrased in another way, the
question is: "How much money must be available for benefit pay-
ments and operating costs, and when will it be needed?"
There are many diverse factors which must be weighed in deter-
mining a plan's liquidity needs. These factors include the work force
characteristics normally considered by an actuary in calculating fund-
ing needs, such as the age profile of the work force, expected employee
turnover, the ratio of active to retired lives in defined contribution plans,
and projections for work force expansion or contraction. Additional
factors which affect the amount of available reserves necessary to make
benefit payments will include the amount and stability of contributions
and the percentage of the sponsor's total corporate income required
to meet contribution requirements. For example, the rapidly increasing
financial needs of a plan may be met more easily by increased em-
ployer contributions if the plan's sponsor has a healthy balance sheet
and is in a capital intensive rather than a labor intensive industry; in
those circumstances, pension contributions would not be a significant
drain on net assets.
The relationship between contribution levels and benefit payments
can impact upon the need for short term cash or liquid reserves, thereby
dictating certain investment behavior. For example, if a multiemployer
pension plan is operating so that current benefit payments, and those
for the next five-year period, can be met by incoming contributions,
there will be a stable reserve of assets which may be invested under a
long term strategy. However, if significant asset withdrawals are
necessary to cover benefit payments, the plan's assets cannot be tied up
in investments which can be liquidated only by taking a significant
investment loss. Other factors, such as the age profile of those workers
covered by the plan, the projections for stable or increasing contribution
levels based upon steady or increasing employment in the industry, or
projections of the need for benefit increases to meet inflation or labor
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market competition, all affect the plan's available amount of money
and the time frame during which it will be available for investment
purposes.
Additional factors affecting the need for reserves include projec-
tions of the economic strength of the sponsoring employer, industry
growth patterns, and the relative strength of the parties in a collectively
bargained plan which may be the subject of impending contract nego-
tiations. An example that demonstrates the impact of economic or
industry trends is the compound pressure that multiemployer welfare
plans often face during periods of high unemployment in the covered
work force. Not only do contributions diminish as employment de-
creases, but plans often experience increased benefit demands when
workers are in layoff status, unable to make contributions, but nonethe-
less taking advantage of health and welfare benefits.
Each of these considerations will influence the direction and level
of asset flow in employee benefit plans. Therefore, in setting investment
objectives and implementing those objectives, the maturity date, mix,
and liquidity characteristics of asset holdings will be dictated by
liquidity needs which must be considered if the plan is to produce a
realistic return on invested plan assets and still be able to make benefit
payments.
B. Retaining a Professional Investment Manager
After a thorough review of plan characteristics and needs has been
completed, one of the most important questions facing many em-
ployee benefit plans is whether it is necessary or desirable to obtain
professional investment advice and whether to designate an investment
manager under section 402(c) (3) of ERISA.2° ' As noted earlier, if
the plan has a limited pool of assets, and if those assets are expended
without being held for an appreciable period of time, short term govern-
ment obligations, a savings account, or even a checking account for
part of the fund may well be appropriate. Under such circumstances,
sophisticated and costly professional investment services are not neces-
sary. However, if a significant asset pool is available, and a greater
return on assets consistent with plan needs would be possible through
sound asset management, professional expertise should be made avail-
able to the plan.
201. Section 402(c) (3) provides: "Any employee benefit plan [may] provide -
(3) that a person who is a named fiduciary with respect to control or management of
the assets of the plan may appoint an investment manager or managers to manage
(including the power to acquire and dispose of) any assets of a plan." 29 U.S.C. §
1102(c) (3) (Supp. V 1975).
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In recent years, the investment management industry has become
a major force in the financial sector of the economy.2"' In 1970, $700
billion, or about one-fourth of the total national wealth, consisted of
debt and equity securities held by institutional investors. 205  This huge
growth in investment assets has been paralleled by the growth of in-
vestment firms and professional managers. °4 As more and more of
our nation's private capital reserves are being held by private employee
benefit plans, it is logical to expect that professional investment man-
agers will be managing a significant percentage of the approximately
$200 billion in assets held by these plans. 0 '
The question now is to what extent this trend will be encouraged
by ERISA's provision that retaining a qualified investment manager, 
20 6
consistent with the plan's authorizing provisions, will relieve the plan
trustees of day-to-day responsibility for investment decisions,2 0 7 so
long as the investment manager is prudently selected and retained. An
added impetus behind a movement toward professional investment man-
agers could be found in the elimination of exculpatory clauses and the
opening of the federal courts to participants and beneficiaries who wish
to challenge the actions of plan fiduciaries. 20 8 However, the mere desire
to shift responsibility and ultimate liability for investment decisions
should not overshadow the basic issue of whether the plan's charac-
teristics (and the available time and expertise of the plan fiduciaries)
suggest the need for professional advice. In this area of plan operations,
as well as all others involving the discharge of fiduciary obligations,
a fiduciary must act "solely in the interest of the participants and bene-
ficiaries and ... with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence ... that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters
would use ... -"209 Therefore, if a review of the plan's characteristics
and needs indicates that professional investment advice would be in
the best interests of the plan, and can be afforded, a prudent course
under ERISA suggests that such assistance should be sought.
Once the threshold decision has been made that a professional
investment manager should be retained, the process of selecting an
appropriate manager is a key aspect of the plan fiduciary's obligations.
202. See Hearings on Investment Policies of Pension Funds Before the Subcomm.
on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 218 (1970)
(Statement of David L. Babson) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Investment
Policies].
203. Id.
204. See id. at 224-25.
205. See N. TURE, supra note 3, at 19.
206. ERISA, § 405(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c) (Supp. V 1975).
207. Id. § 405(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(d).
208. See notes 151-63 and accompanying text supra.
209. ERISA, § 404(a) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (B) (Supp. V 1975).
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This selection process involves a review of such questions as: Can the
prospective investment manager effectively manage this type of fund?
Are the manager's organization and investment philosophies consistent
with the needs of the plan? Certain investment managers have reputa-
tions as being stronger in the equity area than in the fixed income
area, 21 or vice versa, and while a number of managers can perform well
under varied investment plans, plan fiduciaries should satisfy themselves
that the particular manager selected has performed well under similar in-
vestment plans, has a sound organization with adequate resources and
capitalization, and has a well-conceived management structure for hand-
ling investment accounts. Considerations which can affect these judg-
ments include past performance as some indication of the return a
manager may be able to achieve on the plan's assets. However, prior
percentages are meaningless without comparative data on the objectives
and strategies used to achieve those results. Although selection based
upon prior performance has gained some support of late, there has been
some sound criticism of its predictive value."' A better measurement
of a manager's past performance would be that manager's track record
for meeting the stated objectives of clients. Fund managers must be
cognizant of the fact that their performance will be measured by their
ability to achieve results consistent with the plan's stated objectives. An
organization's ability to execute professionally, to adapt its behavior to
the needs of the client plan, and to resist many of the shortrun competi-
tive pressures which may be inconsistent with plan objectives are even
more important than records of raw percentage yields in the past.
212
C. Establishing Investment Objectives and Strategies
1. The Planning Process
Once it has been decided that a professional investment manager
should be retained, and such selection has occurred, the process of
charting the plan's basic investment objectives should begin. The
participants in this process should include the plan sponsor or trustees,
the actuary, and the investment manager. The plan's legal counsel
also can play an appropriate role in this process if used as a resource
by the other participants. However, at this stage, counsel should be
210. See Top 50 Performers in Equity and Fixed Categories, Pensions and In-
vestments, Sept. 13, 1976, at 11, col. 1.
211. See Walton, Pension Funds Sharpening Approaches in Selecting Right
Investment Manager, 13 INT'L FOUNDATION DIG. 10 (1976). The author notes that a
recent Canadian study indicates that the practice of selecting investment managers on
the basis of past performance has many pitfalls. Id. Top quartile performers in
1974 came from the bottom quartile performers of 1969. Id.
212. Finally, cost should be considered in determining whether the plan is obtain-
ing competitive rates, although "bargain" rates may well point out weaknesses in
support operations which are necessary to produce sound performance.
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careful not to distract the planners from the development of sound
investment objectives, drawn from the characteristics and needs of the
plan. Well-conceived investment objectives should be reviewed in light
of ERISA's standards, so that potential problem areas can be identified.
But legal issues should not be the starting point for developing original
objectives.
The degree of interaction between plan sponsors and investment
managers during the objective-setting process varies considerably be-
tween particular plans and particular managers. On balance, however,
ERISA's requirements that a plan contain "a procedure for establish-
ing and carrying out a funding policy and method consistent with the
objectives of the plan and the requirements of [ERISA]," and that
fiduciaries prudently manage plan assets consistent with plan objec-
tives and needs215 suggest that the plan fiduciaries can not abdicate
this responsibility by retaining an investment manager. Investment
managers may well face litigation challenging investment results which
were achieved by adherence to deficient objectives set by plan sponsors.
Therefore, both parties must be involved in the objective-setting process.
2. Desired Rate of Return and Risk Tolerance
Two of the key components in developing investment objectives
and deciding upon an acceptable investment strategy to achieve them
are the interrelated concepts of desired rate of return and risk toler-
ance. Traditional theory indicates that risk is often viewed as the
premium investment or price that must be paid for the opportunity
to obtain an increased rate of return.214 Although a detailed discus-
sion of the theoretical relationship between risk and return is beyond
the scope of this article, 215 many of the commonly recognized aspects
of risk include the possibility of deterioration in the underlying value
of the asset, the degree of fluctuation in asset value (volatility), and
the risk that the return on an investment will not achieve the predicted
level of return as a result of such factors as common inflation. '1
6
213. ERISA, § 402(b) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
214. See, e.g., Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J.
1604, 1607-08 (1971).
215. For further discussion of this relationship, see generally H. MARKOWITZ,
PORTFOLIO SELECTION (1959); D. PETERSON, FINANCIAL RATIOS AND INVESTMENT
RESULTS (1974); W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS (1970).
For less mathematical analyses, see FINANCIAL ANALYSTS' HANDBOOK I: METHODS,
THEORY, AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT (S. Levine ed. 1975); J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON,
THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE (1973).
216. Hayes, The Multi-Dimensional Aspects of Risk, 2 J. OF PORTFOLIO MANAGE-
MENT 23 (1976) ; Kennedy, The Risks of More Give than Take, 2 J. OF PORTFOLIO
MANAGEMENT 15 (1976).
[VOL. 22 : p. 15
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss1/2
FEDERAL PRUDENT MAN RULE
As plan objectives are being developed, a necessary rate of return
is determined which will meet the plan's projected funding needs
(including funding for projected benefit increases) when combined
with an acceptable or fixed level of contributions over the time frame
being analyzed. For example, a plan may decide that it is willing to
sacrifice a certain portion of a potential long term rate of return in order
to obtain a more limited level of volatility in the value of the fund's
assets and, consequently, a more predictable level of contributions
for meeting funding needs. Such a plan may decide that its charac-
teristics and needs indicate that preservation of assets, combined
with limited volatility in asset value and predictable contribution
levels are consistent with its funding and liquidity needs; a reduced
rate of return on assets may be acceptable for such protection and
stability. On the other hand, a plan that has made a reasoned de-
cision to combat the effects of increasing inflation over a long term
period by seeking a higher rate of return may turn to investment
vehicles such as equity securities which historically have produced
a higher return, but which also have a history of higher volatility.21
Equity securities have become the most popular investment ve-
hicle today. Even with recent stock market performance which has
produced increased interest in fixed income securities, equities still
comprise 63% of private plan holdings.218 The pattern of greater
returns on common stocks over fixed income investments has caused
a shift to common stocks.219 In the recent past, debt securities have
slightly outperformed common stock, but over extended periods (and
assuming no adjustment for risk), equity investments have per-
formed considerably better than fixed income investments. 22' Equities
also are viewed as a better hedge against inflation.22'
In translating the foregoing general propositions into strategies
for achieving return at the chosen level of risk, decisions are then
made on a portfolio mix between equity, fixed income investments,
and other investment vehicles such as real estate, mutual funds,222
217. Hearings on Investment Policies, supra note 202, at 222-23; see P. DIETZ,
PENSION FUNDS: MEASURING INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE 31-43 (1966); PENSION
FUND MANAGEMENT, supra note 195, at 75-80.
218. N. TURE, supra note 3, at 20.
219. Hearings on Investment Policies, supra note 202, at 223; PENSION FUND
MANAGEMENT, supra note 195, at 53.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Straus, Investing Through Mutual Funds, 1 EMPLOYEE BENEFITS J. 14 (1975).
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pooled investment accounts, 22 3 index funds,224 options,2 5 and guar-
anteed return contracts. From historical data based upon a time frame
of fifty years or less, studies of the performance of common stocks,
bonds, and government securities can be done to indicate the proba-
bilities of expected returns for portfolios either with different asset
mixes or different components within asset mix.
226
As noted earlier, the prudence standards contained in ERISA
were enacted with an appreciation of the fact that many of the statu-
tory principles drew upon common law concepts. 227  Nevertheless,
the courts are expected to interpret the prudent man rule "bearing
in mind the special nature and purposes of employee benefit plans' 2 8
and recognizing the wide diversity between plans in terms of size,
purpose, and characteristics. 2 ' Because of these diverse characteristics
and purposes, no single set of investment objectives is universally appli-
cable which ensures compliance with ERISA's standards of prudence.
Employee benefit plan assets are being managed in a marketplace
that has accepted modern portfolio theory, which focuses upon the
relationship among the individual investments comprising a portfolio.
This theory rejects the notion that a trustee's or investment manager's
performance should be measured solely by the riskiness of a single
investment, without regard to that investment's relationship to other
223. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 49, at 305.
224. Babson, Index Funds: Why Throw in the Towel?, 2 J. OF PORTFOLIO MANAGE-
MENT 53 (1976). See also Langbeim & Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment
Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1; Langbeim & Posner, The Revolution
in Trust Investment Law, 62 A.B.A.J. 887 (1976). For a rebuttal to the Langbeim
and Posner thesis, see Humbach & Dresch, Prudence, Information, and Trust Invest-
ment Law, 62 A.B.A.J. 1309 (1976).
225. Options are contracts which entitle the holder to purchase or to sell a given
quantity of stock for a set price before a definite date in the future. H. FILER, UNDER-
STANDING PUT & CALL OPTIONS 18-19 (1966). The attractiveness of options is a
consequence of the limited amount of money which must be spent in comparison to the
underlying security. The premium on an option is generally 10% of the value of the
underlying stock. Note, Prudence in Trust Investments, 8 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 491,
517-18 (1975). The issue here is whether these techniques have a role to play in
modern portfolio construction. Viewed in terms of a total portfolio theory, use of
these vehicles for certain plans might be prudent. For example, these techniques may
produce no current income, because the underlying security may be "owned" by
another party if the plan has purchased a call; however, the writing of a call does
produce an immediate source of return through "premium."
226. See Ibbotson & Sinquefield, Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation: Year-by-Year
Historical Returns (1926-1974), 49 J. Bus. U. CHI. 11 (1976) ; Ibbotson & Sinquefield,
Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation: Simulations of the Future (1976-2000), 49 J. Bus.
U. CHI. 313 (1976). For simulations with regard to differing components within
asset mix, see generally D. PETERSON, FINANCIAL RATIOS AND INvESTMENT RESULTS
(1974).
227. See notes 73-75 and accompanying text supra.
228. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 49, at 302.
229. Klevan, supra note 185, at 152, 153 & nn.5a & 7.
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asset holdings in the portfolio.2 0  This analysis recognizes that to
the extent that particular assets or categories of assets react differ-
ently (an inverse relationship) to the same economic, market, or
political conditions, the volatility of the portfolio as a whole has been
reduced. Therefore, when a trustee or investment manager is called
upon to account for the prudence of his investment actions, a consider-
tion of the construction of the entire portfolio must be an integral
part of the analysis rather than an isolated examination of individual
investments.
This total portfolio approach to measuring prudent investment
behavior is not consistent with some state law precedent involving
trusts other than employee benefit trusts. As the New York Court of
Appeals decision in Bank of New York v. Spitzer231 would indicate,
state courts faced with personal trust suits will often turn to common
law precedents, which place emphasis on individual investments. In
determining the impact of the New York case, however, it should be
noted that Spitzer involved a personal trust, and that the court's
language concerning the emphasis on individual investments was
dicta.232  Furthermore, the ultimate decision was favorable to the
trustee because the court recognized that "hindsight" and the standard
of "investment infallability" were improper tests.233 As the earlier
discussion indicates, common law trusts which do not have the con-
tinuing contribution, tax qualification, and other distinguishing char-
acteristics of employee benefit trusts cannot provide an appropriate
analytical structure for measuring prudence under ERISA. If that
case were followed, it would result in a direct frustration of the legis-
lative intent underlying ERISA, which stressed the unique nature
and purposes of employee benefit plans.23 4
3. Achieving Appropriate Diversification
Considerations of diversification are integrally related to ques-
tions of risk and volatility. The guidelines for appropriate diversifica-
tion under ERISA are not susceptible to fixed percentages which will
apply to all plans. The factors to be considered, which are set forth
in the Conference Report 235 and closely parallel the standards con-
230. Cohen, supra note 214, at 1609-11; Note, supra note 178, at 970.
231. 35 N.Y.2d 512, 323 N.E.2d 700, 364 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1974).
232. Id. at 515, 323 N.E.2d at 703, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
233. Id. at 516, 323 N.E.2d at 704, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 169; see Klevan, supra note
185, at 155 n.16.
234. See Klevan, supra note 185, at 155.
235. See note 49 supra.
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tained in the Restatement,' 6 include the following: "(1) the pur-
poses of the plan; (2) the amount of the plan assets; (3) financial
and industrial conditions; (4) the type of investment, whether mort-
gages, bonds or shares of stock or otherwise; (5) distribution as to
geographical location; (6) distribution as to industries; (7) the dates
of maturity.12 7 When these considerations are translated into operat-
ing guidelines, they indicate that an unreasonably large proportion of
the plan assets should not be tied up in a single security, or in securities
dependent upon the success of one company, industry, or the conditions
in one locality. In addition, maturity dates should be staggered if the
liquidity needs of the plan indicate different periods of cash demands. S
Consistent with the general importance placed upon flexibility
throughout the fiduciary provisions of ERISA, the Conference Report
explicitly states that in deciding on a diversification policy, "a prudent
fiduciary must consider the facts and circumstances of each case."2 9
This means that the differing size, purpose, and current characteris-
tics of individual plans will produce different criteria for appropriate
diversification.
2 40
4. Investment Time Frames
The time frame within which an investment strategy is imple-
mented directly affects notions of liquidity, achievable rate of return,
asset mix, diversification, and other components in the investment
process. Returning to examples discussed earlier,2 4 ' a welfare plan
such as a training or vacation fund which expends most of its annual
contributions during the course of a year has a short time horizon
that will limit the types of investments which would be consistent with
its cash flow requirements. On the other hand, a defined benefit
pension plan covering a young work force, with contributions which
can be expected to exceed benefit payments well into the future, has
greater flexibility in selecting assets which can be held for long term
growth and return potential. Likewise, real estate holdings, long
term mortgages, or deposit contracts which include penalties for short
236. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 228, Comment b (1959).
237. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 49, at 304.
238. The diversification aspects of pooled funds, mutual funds, and insurance con-
tracts were considered during the legislative process. The diversification rule is to
be applied to these pooled investment mechanisms by examining the diversification of
the underlying investments in the pool. Therefore, a plan could be invested wholly
in an insurance annuity contract on the assumption that an insurance company's
assets are to be invested in a diversified manner. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 49,
at 305.
239. Id. at 304.
240. Id.
241. See text accompanying notes 193-94 supra.
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term withdrawals would be more consistent with this latter plan's
needs than with the needs of the vacation or training trust. When
short time horizons are involved, the liquidity of widely traded equi-
ties offers an opportunity to dispose of assets more readily. This
feature would then be balanced against the prospect that sale of a
security at an inopportune time could produce an undesirable loss.
Thus, when a plan sponsor is developing its investment objectives
with an investment manager, the time frame for investments and
for evaluating the manager's performance is an integral component
of the process and one which must be agreed upon between the parties.
5. Statement of Objectives
As discussed above, during the process of setting a plan's invest-
ment objectives, the participants will be discussing desired rates of
return, risk, liquidity, diversification, and investment time frames.
The entire effort, however, can be lost or greatly attenuated unless
the final step in the process is the development of a written statement
of investment objectives, agreed to by the plan sponsor and investment
manager, to clarify the responsibilities of the parties and the appli-
cable standards of performance. The plan sponsor and investment
manager should conclude the process with a clear understanding of
such issues as:
1. The rate of return sought through management of the assets;
2. A general statement of the risk tolerance for the plan;
3. The scope of the manager's discretion to acquire and hold par-
ticular kinds of assets, and to determine the amounts;
4. The time frames for measuring performance;
5. The procedures which will be used to monitor and evaluate
performance.
D. Measuring Investment Performance
As important as objectives and manager selection are to sound
asset management, the ongoing process of monitoring the performance
of plan trustees or designated investment managers lies at the core of
the fiduciary responsibility for managing plan assets. 24" Fulfilling
this fiduciary obligation requires periodic reviews of investment per-
formance to determine if original objectives have been achieved and
whether any modifications in underlying plan objectives or investment
242. See BoGERT, supra note 165, at § 685. A trustee, upon taking office, either by
receipt of the trust property from the settlor or executor owes the trust the duty of
examining the trust property "for the purpose of ascertaining whether it corresponds
in kind and amount with that which ought to be delivered." Id. The trustee also
owes the duty of examining and checking the investments periodically. Id. § 685, at 355.
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strategies are warranted. In order to achieve the limitation of liability
contemplated by section 405(d) of ERISA,2 43 the named fiduciary
must not only act prudently in choosing an investment advisor but
also must act prudently and in the best interests of the plan in main-
taining a proper review of the investment manager's performance.244
The evaluation process can draw upon varying standards in gauging
the performance of the investment manager.245 Some commentators
have accepted the performance of one pension plan relative to other
plans as a relevant criterion.246  However, the differences between
plans render most such comparisons superficial.2 4 The comparative
method of evaluation is weakened by the dissimilar investment objec-
tives among plans, differences in investment timing, investment phi-
losophies, ability to absorb risk, varying dates of plan inception, size,
funding posture, liquidity needs and financial condition of the sponsor.
Meaningful interfund comparison can be made only if quantitative
data is supplemented with information concerning fund objectives and
philosophies, to ensure that similar plans are actually being compared.24
Comparison with other investment managers also creates pressure to
perform in the "short run," which may not be advantageous to long
term planning. If professional money managers are called upon to
outperform other money managers, it can create a preoccupation with
day-to-day results and inhibit the rational implementation of a plan's
objectives.
Undue reliance on established stock indices as a measure of a
manager's performance should also be suspect. Again, such compari-
sons neither gauge relative risks taken to achieve particular results
nor consider certain factors in a plan's makeup which either demand
a higher return or a more conservative yield than the Standard and
Poors' 500.
The cornerstone for reviewing the investment performance of a
manager or plan should be the original investment objectives estab-
lished for the plan in question. Investment managers should be
evaluated on their ability to meet these stated objectives and goals
243. ERISA, § 405, 29 U.S.C. § 1105 (Supp. V 1975).
244. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 49, at 301.
245. See generally McCandlish, Some Methods for Measuring of a Pension Fund,
FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J. 105 (1965). For example, compound of return measures
whether the fund would have been better off being deposited in a savings bank or an
insurance company. Average return relates total earnings to a base investment.
.Another technique measures performance in terms of the trend of a fund's market value.
246. See id. at 109.
247. See PENSION FUND MANAGEMENT, supra note 195, at 116.
248: Id. I
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rather than on a superficial review of recent market activity or the
average performance of other investors. In addition, it is important
to evaluate performance results so that interim, long term, and full
composite results can be reviewed against the time frames in the
original investment objectives. This step makes it possible to deter-
mine whether year-end performance levels are low because of one poor
quarter or whether mediocre year-long results were improved by a
flurry of good luck and high activity in the last quarter of the report-
ing year.
Similarly, an attempt should be made to determine whether the
net result was achieved by broad participation of the asset holdings
or whether a few isolated high return investments lifted the net per-
formance level of the portfolio. These and other types of information
can aid in evaluating the actual management of an account. Also, the
investment manager should be challenged to explain, in understand-
able terms, the reasons behind particular results. Were they attribu-
table to unusual economic or market conditions, an unrealistic original
expectation for investment return, or the turnover that was necessary
to restructure a portfolio for which the manager recently assumed
responsibility? These and other factors should be assessed in deciding
how successful the manager has been, whether consideration should
be given to changing managers, or whether current investment policies
should be revised.
The key to an effective monitoring of professional investment
managers is a procedure which ensures that the plan sponsor or trustee
controls the nature, timing, and content of the reviews. A "slick
overview" or complicated report which confuses or buries real per-
formance results is of little help to the fiduciaries seeking to discharge
their obligations to the plan, its participants, and beneficiaries. It
also does little to capitalize on the investment manager's expertise,
which can be helpful in reexamining underlying plan objectives.
VII. CONCLUSION
Much of the emphasis under ERISA is on the procedures
2 49
which should be followed in properly managing assets or selecting
and monitoring investment managers. This emphasis is based upon
the fact that sound management of employee benefit plan assets and
proper fiduciary conduct under ERISA's prudent man rule are tied
249. Many of ERISA's key provisions place emphasis on procedures withim whic
different courses of action may be pursued. For example, ' rocedure for estabrisbing
a funding policy is required by section 402(b) (1), and the "protedure" for p1ernftinil
allocation of responsibilities must be in the plan pursuant to section 402(b) ZJ. See
ERISA, § 402(b) (1), (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b) (1), (9) (pf. E2'c193J).
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to a standard which focuses upon the "care, skill, prudence, and dili-
gence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in
the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims."25
Prior to the adoption of ERISA, investment policy was found in
state statutes, case law, and trust instruments. The fact that an in-
vestment was on a "legal list" raised a strong presumption that the
investment was sound.251 However, the ERISA prudent man stand-
ard has effectively eliminated "legal lists" for employee benefit plan
investments. Standard rules to fit all plans are not consistent with
ERISA's purposes. ERISA contemplates a diversity of plans, with
a standard of prudence that reflects the differences between plans.
The relevant factors under ERISA are not whether a plan per-
formed better than most plans, but instead whether the needs of the
plan and its participants and beneficiaries were carefully determined;
whether realistic investment objectives and strategies were developed
to meet those needs; whether care was used in selecting, monitoring,
and retaining a professional investment manager; and whether plan
objectives and strategies were reviewed periodically for appropriate
modification to meet changing circumstances. Because all plans are
not identical, courts will have to recognize their differences in measur-
ing compliance with these principles and assessing possible liability.
Similarly, the courts will be called upon to recognize modern
concepts of portfolio management as they apply to employee benefit
trusts, which are distinctly different from common law trusts. This
should lead to the acceptance of the principle that each investment
should be acquired and retained not only for its intrinsic qualities but
also for its place in a plan's overall portfolio strategy. This result
does not mean that speculation has been promoted by ERISA's
prudent man standard. But neither does it mean that conservative in-
vestment strategies are mandated unless the characteristics and needs
of the particular plan so dictate.
Governed by the circumstances prevailing at the time of the in-
vestment decision, fiduciaries cannot be held to an infallible standard.
Unforeseen movements in the market should not result in instant
liability. Nevertheless, ERISA's prudent man rule should prompt
a heightened awareness of the need for careful attention to the man-
agement of plan assets. Prudent methodologies, practiced by different
investment managers or plan trustees, will result in sound, but di-
verse, practices.
250. Id. § 404(a) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (B).
251. See text accompanying notes 164-89 supra.
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The underlying rules governing fiduciary responsibility have not
changed drastically with ERISA. However,, some plans and invest-
ment managers will be required to take a more thoughtful and ana-
lytical approach to the manner in which plans are administered and
assets are managed. In. addition, documentation of the steps taken to
develop sound and appropriate investment practices will be required.
The major change in this area under ERISA is that the actions of
fiduciaries will be reviewed and challenged .more frequently. Access
to the federal courts to enforce fiduciary standards has been granted
to participants and beneficiaries ;25 fiduciaries have been made per-
sonally liable ;25 and prospective plaintiffs, have been given a statutory
basis to recover attorneys' fees for bringing such actions.
254
To estimate properly the impact of these. new statutory responsi-
bilities and remedies, it is helpful to bifurcate the analysis in deter-
mining whether fiduciaries have been exposed to increased liability
under ERISA. The two components of. the analysis are the likeli-
hood of litigation .challenging fiduciary conduct and the probability
of ultimate substantive liability. It would appear that the probability
of substantive liability has not increased significantly due to ERISA.
Indeed, tempering common law precepts..of prudence with a recog-
nition of the nature of employee benefit, plans: and modern investment
practices should produce more flexible. standards for judging fiduciary
conduct in managing plan assets*. In.assessing the likelihood of litiga-
tion challenging fiduciary conduct, however, it can be expected that
the new statutory remedies and .improved access to the courts will
increase the probability .of litigation, -at least at the outset.
252. ERISA, § 502(a) (1), 29 U.S.C § 1132(a)'(1)' (Supp. V 1975).
253. Id. §§ 405 409, 29 U.S.C. :§§ 1105, 1109.
254. Id. § 502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g).
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